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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
An offshoot of welfare-state has been enormous 
state activism. The diversified state activism has 
brought in occasions where an individual comes in 
conflict with other individuals or with the adminis-
tration. This has necessitated the evolution of 
administrative adjudicatory system to cope with the new 
problems and impart speedy, cheap justice while 
implementing the governmental policies. The traditional 
judicial system due to paucity of time and lack of 
expertise could not do as much as an specialised insti-
tution can. The process in the ordinary court is 
expensive, tardy, cumbersome and lacking in expertise. 
The up-coming problems are of such a nature that if 
decision is delayed, the developmental process will be 
hampered. The conventional system is thus, inapt, 
affecting in reality the quality of justice imparted. 
The instrumentality of tribunals comes up as a 
desideratum. 
The well established political institutions and 
faith in law gave rise to rule of law in England and 
made Dicey ridicule the administrative adjudication, but 
the fear of accummulation and monopoly of powers and 
fear of security of the individual liberty gave 
rise to Droit Administratiff in France and created 
more or less independent administrative adjudication. 
<>-
This led to enunciation by Montesqieu what was later 
/• 
termed as the theory of separation of powers. The 
growing complexity of web of the society due to an 
all round development brought about by the Industrial 
revolution, the growing sense of security for individ-
ual rights, the economic and social progress, and the 
Courts finding themselves on occasions unable to 
appreciate the issues involving administrative intrica-
cies, gave rise to the sharing of some judicial functioas 
by the executive also. As explained in Encyclopaedia 
Britainnica the growth of welfare state changed the 
position and "Calls for new tools which are more flexi-
ble than detailed legislation enforced by the judicial 
process. The modern bureaucacy is one of these indis-
pensable tools. The executive functions calls for 
exercise of discretion and judgement also and not a mere 
dumb obedience of the orders. Today the executive 
besides enforcing laws, also performs quasi-judicial and 
quasi-legislative functions. Hence the administrative 
adjudication lias become an indispensable part of the 
modern state activity. 
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica Volume 1 Page 16i 
Justice through Administrative Tribunals has many 
distinguishing features. Though being quicker and cheaper 
it may not always be objective totally. Public policy 
and public good may sometimes be the expedient and over-
riding considerations before the Tribunals. Further as 
the Tribunals are not bound by any laws of Evidence and 
laws of procedure with which we are quite familiar, their 
unconventional approach and working may be puzzling to 
a quizzical lawyer. This calls for a much better home-
work and exercise on his part and he has to be ever alert 
to get his case through in favour of his client. He, in 
fact, may have to niould himself into a different set of 
discipline from what he is accustomed to heretofore; 
The decisions of Tribunals being final excepting an appeal 
to the Supreme Court under Article 136, much greater 
vigilance and restraint on the part of both the applicant 
as well as his advocate is necessary. The case must be 
very throughly prepared, presented and pursued. Any 
material lacunae may bring a life-long lamentation to the 
unwary employee. So complete facts and evidence and 
authorities/rules etc. must be collected as soon as one 
decides to go to the Tribunal so that he may establish 
his grievance successfully. The department must also 
take up the case in all seriousness and without waste 
of time because, unlike in the courts so far, the 
deponent> may not get frequent adjournments. 
This all necessitates the following and under-
standing of the correct procedure and the law relating 
to the Administrative Tribunals. 
The enactment of the Administrative Tribunals 
Act, 1985 seeks to give effect to the constitutional 
provision by providing for the establishment of Adminis-
trative Tribunals and by conferring on them all the 
jurisdiction power and authority exercisable by all 
courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to all 
service matters of persons appointed to public services 
and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union 
or of any state or of any local or other autliority 
within the territory of India or under the control of 
the Government of India, or of any corporation or society 
owned or controlled by the Government and for matters 
CO anacted therewith or incidental thereto. As from 
November 1, 1985, all courts in the country except the 
Supreme Court, have ceased t^ have jurisdictioa in 
regard to service matters. Pending cases would stand 
transferred to the concerned Bench of the Administrati'^ 
Tribunal except appeals pending in the High Courts. 
The pending appeals would bo heard at the respective 
High Court. The setting up of the tribunals is a 
significant step in administrative reforms. It will 
provide speedy relief to aggrieved public servants. 
However, the provisions of the act do not apply to 
matters of armed forces, officers or staff of the 
Parliament and State legislatures. 
Prior to the establishment of the Benches is 
under Administrative Tribunals Act,writ petitions were 
filed in various High Courts as well as the Supreme 
Court challenging the constitutional validity of 
Article 323 of the constitution and the provisions of 
the Act. The main contention in the writ petitions was 
that impugned legislation attacked the writ jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 
as well as in the High Courts under Article 226 of the 
Constitution. Although the Supreme Court, by an interim 
order, stayed the transfer of writ petitions filed in 
the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 
to the Central Administrative Tribunal, it did not stay 
the transfer of writ petitions under Article 226 subject 
to the condition that the Government would make certain 
amendments in the Act. One of the amendments suggested 
by the court was that each case in the Tribunal must bs 
heard by a Bench consisting of one Judicial Member and 
one non-Judicial Member and the appointment of JudiciaJ 
Members should be done in consultation with the Chief 
Justice of India. An undertaking was given in the 
Supreme Court by the Attorney General on behalf of 
the Government that a Bill to make suitable amendments 
in the Act would be brought before Parliament as early 
2 
as possible • As the writ petitions referred to above 
were expected to come up for hearing, the President 
promulgated the Administrative Trijnjnals (Amendment) Act 
3 
1986 , so as to give effect to the assurance given in 
Supreme Court and to make some other amendments found 
necessary in the administration of the Act. 
The constitution of the Act has been upheld by 
the Supreme Court . However the court while retaining 
its own writ jurisdiction has also upheld the curtail- , 
ment of the writ jurisdiction in service matter of the 
High Court. Now we have an Administrative Tribunal 
dealing with servi-ce matters of Central and State 
employees as a specialised body;howfar and to what 
extent the Administrative Tribunal works efficiently 
and provide speedy and cheap justice to the employees, 
will depend on its administrative processerial aspect. 
2. S.P. Sampath Kumar and others V. Union of India and 
others, ATR 1986 SC 1. 
3. Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, 
ATR 1986 Journal Section 32. 
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Keeping the importance and significance of 
Administrative Tribunal in view the Act has been 
chosen as a fruitful topic of Dissertation for its 
deep study_^ 
The theme of dissertation revolves around the 
problem of Administrative Justice, which is considered 
one of the most striking and significant developments 
of twentieth century statecraft in the fields of 
jurisprudence, public administration and political 
science. .^  
The problem is presented in Chapter I from this 
perspective through a few theoretical formulations and 
as elaboration of the practical indispensability of 
administrative adjudication in modern states committed 
to the ideal's of social justice and concurrent adoption 
and implementation of welfare state policies. It has 
also been shown how administrative adj.udication has 
stolen the thunder from the traditional functions of the 
state as reflected through the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary. All these problems are introduced in 
6 
this chapter through a perief account of the evolution of 
administrative justice in the U.K., the U.S.A. and France, 
with a comparable focus on India, particularly after the 
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 
The importance of adjudicating bodies and 
Tribunals analysed from the point of view of their 
structure and organisation. A new norm for the 
functional classification of these bodies has been 
evolved, in contra-distinction to the traditional 
analysis found elsewhere. Thus these agencies, 
whose number is legion, are grouped and studied in 
Chapter II. The composition of these Tribunals, the 
qualifications for holding Tribunal office as well as 
the tenure of appointment in the context of the type 
and nature of justice administered by these agencies 
are examined in Chapter III. A fairly detailed analysis 
has been done of each of these mentioned, broad catego-
ries and further distinctive factors elucidated. In 
fact, for the first time in the history of administrative 
justice, a clear and comprehensive picture of the 
Administrative Tribunals in India has emerged. • 
Chapter IV discusses the adjudicating process. 
Since the problem of procedure is central to justice, 
all statutes including the Civil Procedure code have 
been scanned in search of a systematic and scientific 
procedure Principles of 'notice', 'hearing', 'evidence' 
'limitations', and so forth are scrutinised to determine 
as to what extent individual liberties are safeguarded 
under the given system of administrative justice. To 
ascertain whether the Tributiais are following the age 
old principles of natural justice, such as 'reasoned 
decisions', 'fair inquiry', and 'application of evidence' 
further studies were done to test the statutory provisions 
Questions of power a^d^^ur isdic t ion , as well as 
the limits tha^ concern Administrative TribunaT_s_j arj 
dealt_^wi^thJji__Ciia4JJ-SX_V. Th(2 nature of the jurisdiction 
and the manner in which the.^e agencies exercise their 
powers in day-to-day situations have been examined 
through case studies. Issues concerning the powers of 
a tribunal to grant a stay or award costs in the original, 
appellate and also revisionjui jurisdiction, in addition 
to question of facts and lavs administered and determined 
by the adjudicating agencies have been discussed. 
An analysis revealed that Tribunals enjoy consi-
derable autono.Tiy in their exercise of judicial powers, 
but far from being independent are subject to scrutiny 
and review by superior courts, i.e., the High Courts 
and the Supreme Court, both in their original and 
residuary iur isd ic t ion s , have been highl ign r.ed . 
Chapter VI concludes dissertation with a 
discussion on the manner in which adjudicating bodies 
come in-to existence. Tribunals have been created as 
and when the occasion and situation demanded, which has 
led to much confusion over their nature and role. Accor-
dingly, suggestions have been made with regard to 
membership, qualifications, mode of recruitment, juris-
diction so on and so forth. The powers to be conferred 
on these administrative bodies and the procedure they 
should follow in the dispensation of justice have also 
been given some thought. A proposal is offered for 
establishing composite tribunals at the district and 
local level in order to facilitate an integrated approach 
and to effect uniformity in their functioning specific 
remedies have been suggested to remove overlapping, 
stream-line their growth, minimise conflict of jurisdi-
ction and simplify work procedures. Ways are suggested 
for making administrative justice (speedies and cheaper 
and placing it within the reach of the common man. 
Methods and institutions are also suggested for freeing 
tribunals from executive bias and enabling them to 
administer ideal impartial and speedier justice. 
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CHAPTER_-_I_^ 
NEED OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 
The main causes for evolution of the system of 
adjudication outside the courts are practically the 
same as has led to the omorgence of deiogated log is la Lion 
viz. extension in governmental operations, activities 
and responsibilities, because of the socio-economic 
changes which are taking place in the country. As for 
example, government is engaging itself more and more in 
planning, in providing social service to the people, in 
controlling the conditions of employment, in providing 
and promoting health, safety and general welfare of the 
community alongwith the expansion in governmental 
operations, tax-base has also been broadened, resulting 
in the levy of new taxes and consequently, leading to a 
vast proliferation of tax-assessing authorities. The 
modern government has come to undertake many functions 
and regulate many matters which generate a number of 
occasions when an individual may be at issue with the 
administration or with another citizen or body as to his 
rights and this creates, the need to adjudicate upon the 
disputes. This,in turn, has necessitated the development 
of the technique of administrative adjudication which 
may better respond to social needs and requirements than 
the elaborate and costly system of decisions through court-
litigation. If all tlic cases generated by the opcraL i oiis of the 
n 
n e w l y e n a c t e d s o c i o - e c o n o m i c l e g i s l a t i o n of t o d a y 
w e r e t o be l e f t t o t h e c o u r t s f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n , t h e n 
n o t o n l y w i l l i t p l a c e a h u g e b u r d e n on th.e j u d i c i a l 
m a c h i n e r y , c l o g g i n g i t b e y o n d r e d e m p t i o n , b u t i t w i l l 
a l s o s l o w down t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s b e c a u s e of 
l o n g d e l a y s w h i c h u s u a l l y o c c u r i n t h e c o j j r t p r o c e e d i n g 
T h e n , t h e r e i s a l s o t h e q u e s t i o n of e x p e r t i s e 
In many c a s e s a r i s i n g o u t of t h e m o d e r n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
p r o c e s s t h a t may need an e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e of p a r t i c u l a r 
s u b j e c t s t o w h i c h t h e s e c a s e s r e l a t e . An e x p e r t may be 
i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o a d j u d i c a t e upon s u c h m a t t e r s 
t h a n a g e n e r a l i s t l a w y e r - j u d g e i n a r e g u l a r c o u r t . 
Thus t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s or q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v i n g c o m p l i c a -
t e d a c c o u n t a n c y o r e c o n o m i c f a c t o r s may h a v e t o be b e t t e r 
l e f t t o be d e t e r m i n e d by s p e c i a l i s e d a d j u d i c a t o r y b o d i e s 
t h a n t h e j u d g e s of t h e c o u r t s who , by t h e i r t r a i n i n g and 
a p p r o a c h may n o t h a v e e n o u g h e x p e r t i s e t o d e a l w i t h t h e m . 
H.M. S e r v a i r i g h t l y s a y s : 
"Admin i s t r a t i ve law as development around the va r ious 
Admin i s t r a t i ve T r i b u n a l s , has become a modern n e c e s s i t y s ince t h a t 
has a d i s t i n c t advantage over the o rd ina ry c o u r t s in t h a t these 
t r i b u n a l s ensure cheapness , a c c e s s i b i l i t y , freedom from t e c h n i c a l i t y 
exped i t i on and exper t knowledge of t j iei^r_j)art icular s u b j e c t " 
1 . S « e r v a i , i l .M. ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of I n d i a ' P a g e 896 
( 1 9 7 6 ) 
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The Indian Parliament realising the need for 
administrative tribunals inserted Article 323-A and Article 
~ 2 323j--^ _in the constitution by 42nd Amendment. As a sequel 
to Article 323-A, Parliament enacted " The Administrative 
3 
Tribunals Act 1985. The preamble has incorporated the 
notions of Article 323-A and envisaged for 'Tribunals' 
to adjudicate upon disputes and complaints with respect 
to requirement and conditions of services of persons 
appointed to public services and posts in connection with 
the affairs of the central and state governments local 
bodies or any corporations and societies owned or controllec 
by the State. 
DEFINITIONS OF TRIBUNALS _ 
"Administrative Tribunals or administrative courts 
are authorities outside the ordinary court system which 
interprets and apply the laws when acts of public adminis-
tration are attacked iKiIformal suits or by other established 
4 
methods. 
"Administrative adjudication is the power vested in 
administrative agencies to make specific determination in 
affecting the rights of individuals," 
2. The constitution 42nd Amendment Act - 1976. 
3. Though tribunals were recognised through Articles-32, 
226 and 227, but a clear provision was lacking. 
4. Blancy and Octman in Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 
Vol. VIII P. 529. 
5. Field in his <Jftovernment in modern society P. 283. 
14 
It is "the process by which administrators settle 
issues arising in the course of their work when legal 
rights are in question." It is a process of regulating 
restraining or supervising of actions which have acute 
social consequence, in the context of particular set of 
circumstances. They are government bodies appertaining 
to the executive and non judicial branch of the state, 
th-ough in various matters they are armed with judicial 
powers analogous to those normally carried out by Courts 
Q 
of Law." The Franks committee has however, laid down: 
That tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery 
provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as 
part of the machinery of administration. The essential 
point is that in all these cases Parliament has deliber-
ately provided for a decision outside and independent 
of the department concerned Although the relevant 
status dtiieSiDQt in all cases expressly enact that tribunals 
are to consist entirely of persons outside the Government 
service,The use of the term tribunal in legislation un-
doubtedly bears., this connotation, and the intention of 
Parliament to provide for the independence is clear and 
9 
unmistakable. 
6. Diraek and Koeing in their Public Administration, P.510 
7. A.W. Mac Mohan in his Delegation and authonomy, P. 98. 
8. Mukherjee J. in Bharat Bank V. Employees A.I.R. 1950 
S.C. 188 
9. Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals 
and inquiries (1957) P.9 
Tribunals are thus administrative bodies, set up 
solely with the idea of discharging quasi-juiiicial duties. 
Their determinations affect the right of parties. They, 
therefore have been held to be quasi-judicial bodies. 
They are required to observe principles of natural justice 
or fair hearing while determining issues before them. 
GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND 
In England a remarkable development had taken place 
in the first quarter of the century. The "Rule of Law" 
had long been regarded as an essential feature of 
English constitutional doctrine some sixty years ago when 
the great English constitutional law authority, A.V. Dicey, 
wrote his law of the constitution, he asserted that 
administrative law as found in France under the name of 
DROIT ADMINISTRATIFF was alien to the common law, unknown 
and undesired in England, and something to be shunned. 
He was satisfied that the official hierarchy should be 
subject to the same law and the same tribunals as those 
provided for private persons. He believed that the 
(.. 
system of administrative law would give offciatdom an 
undesirable preferance. j\ ^  iv^.w,'^"' '""^  ^c-.X ' -r ; 
U-V^-^ 
Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, appointed a );' 
C K 1^^''' ^ 
.-{r 
f 
..^ •^ 
lA 
16 
powers, commissioned "to consider the powers exercised 
by or under the direction of ministers of the Crown by 
way of (a) delegated legislation, and (b) judicial or 
quasi-Judicial decision, and to report what safeguards 
are desirable or necessary to secure the constitutional 
principals of the sovereignty of Parliament and the 
supremacy of the law. 
10. The report of the committee was presented in 1932 .'-
The whole tenor of its approach was that the 
statutory procedure was a vehicle for the principles 
of natural justice, and it was recommended that those 
principles should go further than they did. Natural 
justice ought, it was suggested, to include a right 
to have reasons for the decision, and perhaps also a 
right to see the report of the inspector. The 
committee concluded that in any case, regardless of 
natural justice, the right solution to the dilemma 
of inspectors' reports was to publish them. The right 
to a hearing should also include the right for the 
objector to know in good time the case which he had 
to meet. 
None of these recommendations resulted in any 
change in the law or departmental practice, and 
twenty-five years were to pass before the same questions 
were taken up with greater success by the Frank's 
committee. Meanwhile complaint continued unabated, 
especially on the non-disclosure of inspectors' reports. 
Discontent was aggravated by comparison with the 
enlightened practices of departments such as the 
Ministry of Transport which already employed independent 
inspectors, published their reports, and gave reasons 
for their decisions. 
(Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, 1932, 
cmd. 4060). 
17 
How many recent A.cts provided that questions arising 
out of the administration of the |jCt shall be decided by 
the department of the local government authorities who 
administer it. And these authorities are controlled by 
the ordinary courts and maintained the traditional 'Rule 
of Law' without either abolishing the administrative 
tribunals with their special procedure or introducing the 
system of administrative courts. 
According to the modern theory, Rule of Law is 
reconcilable with the existence of administrative tribunals 
provided they are properly kept under the control of the 
ordinary courts, to ensure that they observe the rules of 
4 
Natural Justice . 
GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN U.S.A. 
Administrative tribunals are flourishing in United 
States with the support of the same Judiciary which is 
unwilling to part with the doctrine of Separation of Powers 
in other spheres. As regards the combination of the 
functions of the investigator, prosecutor and judge in 
the same administrative body, the Supreme Court perhaps 
feels helpless and observes that the evil of such concen-
tration of functioVis, it is the congress to remedy, not 
the courts. 
4. Wade & Phillips, Constitutional law, P. 54 
5. Marcellow V. Bonds, (1955) 349 U.S. 302. 
Administrative tribunals are kept under the control 
of the Courts of Law by the doctrine of judicial review, 
aided by the constitutional requirement of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments that "No person shall be deprived of 
his life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Though the contents of 'due process' as applied 
to administrative tribunals are not rigidly uniform but 
vary with the nature and function of tribunals the minimum 
that is required corresponds to the demands of the English 
doctrine of 'natural justice' from which it has emerged 
and thus postulates the requirement of 'notice and 
opportunity to be heard.' In practice, statutes which 
vest adjudicatory functions in administrative tribunals 
provide for hearing, but even where a statute omits to do 
so, the constitutional requirement would enable the Court 
to interfere and nullify the decision made without an 
opportunity for hearing. 
Although the statutes empowering the commissioner 
to grant, suspend or revoke a liajcji. driver's licence, do 
not expressly require.. .• that these licences may be 
6. Jaint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee V.Mc Grath, 
(1957) 341 U.S. 123(178). 
7. Wong Yang V. Mc Grath, (1950) 339 U.S. 33(49). 
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withdrawn only upon notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, yet it is not necessary that they do so. Where 
the exercise of statutory power adversely "affects 
property rights the courts have implied the require-
ments of notice and hearing, where the statute is 
silent.'I^ji-^But while the court adheres to its orthodox 
view that 'Due Process' can not be abrogated either by 
the legislature or by any of its creatures, the Court 
had diluted the contents of 'Due Process' by holding 
that it does not require a hearing in a court of law 
in every case and that its requirements are satisfied 
if there is a review of the decision of an administrative 
authority at any time before it is made final. 
GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN FRANCE 
We shall examine now the French ideal of Adminis-
trative Law ^ and Tribunal. The Droit Administratifi has 
'J 
vu-^y.^. been defined'as the body of rules which determined the 
^^ horganization an d the duties of public administration, 
land which regulated the relations of the administrative 
authorities towards the citizens of the state. 
The first set of rules of Droit Administrati£ 
determines what type of state officials and adminis-
trative authorities are to be maintained, thsir 
appointment, status, salary, duties, retirement and 
dismissal. The second set of rules determines in 
";i Cv.:'V-\; 'v_<;v)c"^.i^_,.i,.v-J-<i ( 
EO 
what manner public services operate to meet the needs 
of citizens. The third series of rules relate to 
administrative adjudication content Deuz Adraistratif. 
If an administrative authority by its act inflicts an 
injury upon a citizen involving a breach of law.an 
action will lie only before an Administrative Tribunal 
and not the ordinary court (Tribunal civil). An appeal 
is provided to a further administrative authority 
superior in hierarchy. Of the various Administrative 
Tribunals in France such as 'The Conseil d'etat', 
conseil interdepartmental deprefecture, courdes comptes,; 
conseil de 1' Instruction publique, conseils Militaries i 
de revision, the first named is the most important and 
normally competent for administrative litigation. 
The conseil d'etat is endowed with powers of 
strict administration. Its consent is necessary in all 
important administrative matters such as authorising 
public works, declaring a corporation as public utility 
concern, etc. Finally it is the tribunal for redress 
for any injury by reason of the violation of a rule of 
Droit administratif^. Most of the members of the conseil 
e' etat who deals with judicial aspect of its function 
have to pass judicial test just as the Judges of the 
ordinary courts. But the members who also sit on the 
judicial side are tried administrators but who will 
v^ Ju 
not thereafter revert to any such administrative or 
executive work. The Minister of Justice who is a 
politician is the President of the conseil d' etat but 
he will not take part as a judge of the conseil. This 
is said to give assurance of the independance of Judges 
A member of the Counseil d'etat may be removed from 
office while Judges of the ordinary court enjoy the 
privilege of being irremovable. The question as to 
whether a cause is to be tried by the ordinary court or 
by the tribunal was solved in France by the establishment 
of a Supreme Court Tribunal Desconflicts which determines 
all questions of jurisdiction. This body consists of an 
equal number of ordinary Judges of the Com de cessation 
and of administrative Judges of theConseil d' etat, but 
the Minister of Justice who is its president had a 
casting vote which was definitely dangerous. The judgment 
of the conseil d' etat will not be based on the principles 
of Droit civil but on the rules of Droit Adrainistratif. 
There is a code civil but no code for Droit Adrainistratif 
which is mostly Judge-made law, though there is no rule 
of precedent to be followed in the latter. 
Prof. Dicey felt this Administrative law gave 
Government and every one of its servants a whole body-
of special privileges against private citizens. Further 
9 
the extent of these rights was left to be determined 
on principles different from the consideration which 
fix legal rights and duties of one citizen against 
another. Whether it is a question of tort, breach 
of contract, crime or violation of right vouchsafed 
to a citizen under a statute, or compensation for 
damages, or land acquisition, etc., if it was with 
reference to the government or its servant the forum 
could only be the Administrative Tribunal and not the 
ordinary court of the land. 
GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN INDIA 
The extension in Governmental operations, 
activities and responsibilities in India have necess-
arily focussed public attention on the problem of 
administrative adjudication. Most of these are of 
judicial or quasi judicial character. The latter term 
includes the process which is judicial as well as 
administrative. The avoidance of court adjudication 
and resort to administrative tribunal has helped the 
quickening of the pace of administrative process. 
Courts have to deal justice according to law while 
these tribunals render administrative justice with 
the twin guides of law and policy. So it became nece-
ssary for the Legislature to clothe these tribunals 
with some judicial powers so as to enable them to 
make proper decisions. Thus for adjudication of 
Industrial disputes, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 
has been created a three-tier hierarchy of tribunals 
called the labour courts, industrial tribunals and 
national tribunals. They are appointed by the Central 
or State Governments, as the case may be, according to 
the nature of the industry concerned. 
Similarly the custodian of Evacuee Property 
under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950; 
the Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1939; the rent controller under the state Rent Control 
Acts; Representation of the people Act, 1951 has ushered 
in a System of Election Tribunals. 
Apart from these, there are tribunals which are 
called special tribunals in that they are not regular 
courts but have judicial authority and have the troppings 
of a court. 
The number of such tribunals is on the increase 
owing to the Welfare role taken up by the State under 
our constitution, so much so that " the number of 
Indian Statutes which constitute administrative autho-
rities purely administrative and quasi-judicial, is 
legion." ^ 
8. The Fourteenth report of the law commission 
(Reform of judicial Administration), Vol II para 38 
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The constitution Forty Second Amendment Act, 
1976 has inserted part XIVA, comprising articles 323A 
and 323B, in the constitution of India to empower 
Parliament to constitute administrative tribunals in 
the areas of (i) civil service ; (ii) levy, assessment 
collection and enforcement of any tax; (iii) foreign 
exchange, import and export across custom frontiers; 
(iv) industrial and labour disputes; (v) land reforms; 
(vi) ceiling on urban property (vii) elections to the 
legislature; (viii) Production, procurement, supply 
and distribution of foodstuffs and offences relating 
thereto. The amendment provides for exclusion of 
jurisdiction, powers and authority of all courts, 
except the supreme court under article 136, with respect 
to all or any of the matters falling within the juris-
9 
diction of the proposed tribunals. 
The Indian Parliament in pursuance of Article 
323 A(l) enacted the administrative Tribunals Act,1985 
'to provide for the adjudication or trial of disputes 
and complaints' regarding service matters of Central 
and State Government employees. The act gives 
practical shape to the provisions of article 323 A(2). 
Article 323-A of the Constitution stipulates that 
9. Arts. 323 A (2)(d) and 323 B (3)(d). 
10. Gazette of India, Pt. II, S.2. 
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Parliament may by. law, provide for the adjudication 
or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and 
complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions 
of service of persons appointed to public services and 
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or 
of any State or of any local or other authority within 
the territory of India or under the control of the 
Government or of any Corporation owned or controlled 
by the Government. 
The Act seeks to give effect to the constitutional 
provision by providing for establishment of an Adminis-
trative Tribunal for the Union and a separate Adminis-
trative Tribunal for a state or a Joint Administrative 
Tribunal for two or more States. The Act also provides 
(a) for the jurisdiction powers (including the powers to 
punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised 
by each Tribunal (b) the procedure (including provision 
as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed 
by the State Tribunals (c) Exclusion of the jurisdiction 
of all courts, except that of the Supreme Court under 
Article 136 of the Constitution relating to service 
matters (d) The transfer to each Administrative Tribunal 
of any suit or other proceedings pending before any 
court or other authority immediately before the 
establishment of such Tribunal as would have been 
within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal if the causes 
of action on which such suits or proceedings are based 
had arisen after such establishment. 
The establishment of Administrative Tribunal 
under the aforesaid provision of the constitution has 
become necessary since a large number of cases relating 
to service matters are pending before the various courts. 
It is expected that the setting up of such Administrative 
Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters 
would go a long way in not only reducing the burden 
of the various courts and thereby giving them more time 
to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also 
provide to the persons covered by the Administrative 
Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances. 
In Sampath Kumar's case the Supreme Court has 
suggested " that if the Administrative Tribunal is to 
be an equally effective and efficacious substitution 
for the High Court on the basis of which alone the 
11. S.P. Sampath Kumar V. Union of India,(1987) 1 
S.C.C. 124. 
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impugned Act can be sustained, there must be a perma-
nent or if there is not sufficient work, then a circuit 
bench of the Administrative Tribunal at every place 
where there is a seat of the High Court should be 
established. It would, therefore, direct that the 
government to set up a permanent bench and if that is 
not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then 
at least a circuit bench of the Administrative Tribunal 
be set up wherever there is a seat of the High Court". 
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CHAPTER - II 
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS 
[Scope and Extent, Establishment, Composition of ] 
Tribunal and benches. 
SCOPE -
The Act provides for the adjudication by Administrative 
Tribunals of disputes and complaints wi^ Ji respect to 
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed 
to public services and posts in connection with the affairs 
of the Union or ,of any State or of any local or other autho-
rity, within the territory of India or under the control of 
the Government oF Tndia or _of___any Corporation or society 
owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of 
Article 323-A of the constitution and for matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto. 
EXTENT -
The word 'extent' is quite analogous to the world 
"shall come into force" where it lays down in the enactment 
that it extends to the whole of the country or a part of 
it, it does not necessarily mean that it is in force therein 
particularly when there is an express provision that before 
it can come into force something further such as the issue 
of a notification is to be done. 
Sub-section (2) to Section 1 of the 'Act' gives the 
extent of its application. According to clause (a) the 
act applies to whole of India so far as it relates to the 
1. Sunder Singh V. Faqir Chand, AIR 1948 Punj. 47 
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2 
Central Administrative Tribunal. This has rightly 
not excluded the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But the 
3 
Act does not extend to the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
4 
so far as it relates to State Administrative Tribunal. 
It means that the State of Jammu and Kashmir does not have 
the privilege to request the Central Government to 
establish a State Administrative Tribunal. The Jammu and 
Kashmir State employees right to speedy, cheap and 
specialised justice is, thus, infringed under tlio central 
legislation. 
And Section 2 excludes certain categories of 
services from the purview of this 'Act'. The exclusion of 
army personnels alongwith members of higher judiciary and 
secretarial staff of the legislature, do not seem to have 
a common thread passing through. 
ESTABLISHMENT -
The power to establish an Administrative Tribunal, 
known as the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and 
State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) or such Tribunal for 
two or more States to exercise the jurisdiction powers 
2. Hereinafter known as CAT 
3. Clause (b) Section 1(2) of the 'Act'. 
4. Hereinafter known as SAT 
5. Article 370 of the Constitution. It provides that 
the State can establish a tribunal after passing a 
Separate enactment which is a tedious and time 
consuming process. 
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and authority conferred on the Central Administrative 
Tribunal by or under this Act, has been conferred on the 
Central Government by Section 4 of the Act. The condition 
for establishment of an Administrative Tribunal known as 
the Central Administrative Tribunal is that it must be 
established by notification and the notification must 
state that the Tribunal so established shall exercise the 
jurisdiction powers and authority conferred on the Central 
Administrative Tribunal under this Act. In case any request 
is received by the Central Government from State Government 
regarding establishment of a State Administrative Tribunal 
to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred 
on the Administrative Tribunal for the State, the Central 
Government has the discretion to do so and to establish such 
State Administrative Tribunal by notification as per clause 
7 (2) of Section 4 of the Act. As regards the establishment 
of a Joint Administrative Tribunal (JAT) for two states, 
sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act provides that two 
or more states may enter into an agreement that the same 
Administrative Tribunal shall be the Administrative Tribunal 
for each of tha States to the agreement and if such an agree-
ment is approved by the Central Government and published in th 
6. Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985 
7. Section 4(2) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 a:^  -
"The Central Government may on receipt of a request in the 
behalf from any State Govt., establish, by notification, an Admini-
strative Tribunal for the State to be known as the....(Name of the 
State) Administrative Tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction,powers 
and authority conferred on the Administrative Tribunal for the 
State by or under this act. 
0 
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Gazette of India and the official Gazette of each of 
those States then the Central Government at its discretion 
may establish such a joint Administrative Tribunal to 
exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred 
on the Administrative Tribunals for those States by or 
under this Act, notwithstanding anything contained in 
Sub-section(2) and notwithstanding that any or all of 
those States has or have Tribunals under that sub-section. 
The other requirement as contained in sub-section(A) is 
that an agreement under sub-section(3) should contain 
provisions as to the name of the Joint Administrative 
Tribunal, the manner in which the participating State may 
be associated in the selection of the Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and other members of the Joint Administrative 
Tribunal, the places at which the Bench or Benches of the 
Tribunal shall sit, the apportionment of the expenditure in 
connection with the Joint Administrative Tribunal among the 
participating States. The agreement should also contain 
such other supplemental, incidental and consquential 
provisions not inconsistent with this Act as may be deemed 
necessary or expedient for giving effectto the agreement.-
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MANNER OF ESTABLISHING TRIBUNALS TO DISCHARGE FUNCTIONS 
OF CENTRAL AND STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS. 
Sub-section (5) of Section (4) inserted by the 
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act of 1986 con-
templates the power of the Central Government and the 
manner of its exercise to designate all or any of the 
members of the Bench or Benches of the State Administrative 
Tribunal established under sub-section (2) as member of the 
Bench or Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal and 
vice-versa. It lays down that notwithstanding anything 
contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, or 
sub-section (1) of section 5, the Central Government may 
designate all or any of the members of the Bench or Benches 
of the State Administrative Tribunal established for that 
State under sub-section(2) as members of the Bench or 
Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect 
of that state or on receipt of a request in this behalf 
from any State Government to designate all or any of the 
members of the Bench or Benches of the Central Administra-
tive Tribunal functioning in that State as the members 
of the Bench or Benches ofthe State Administrative 
Tribunal for that State and upon such designation, the 
Bench or Benches of the State Administrative Tribunal or, 
as the case may be, the Bench or Benches of the Central 
Administrative Tribunal are deemed in all respects to be. 
The central Administrative Tribunal, or the State Adminis-
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provisions of article. 323 A of the constitution and 
this Act,andisentitled to exercise the jurisdiction 
powers and authority of the Central Administrative 
Tribunal or, as the case maybe, State Administrative 
Tribunal by or under this Act. 
The discretion to exercise the power vests in 
the Central Government and the manner of designating-
Is specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section(5) 
Q 
of Section 4 of the Act. The concurrence of the 
concerned State Government to designate all or any 
of the members of the Bench or Benches of the State 
Administrative Tribunal established for that state as 
members of the Bench or Benches of the Central Admini-
strative . Tribunal in respect of that State is necessary 
for exercising the power. Further the discretion 
to so designate is to be exercised by notification and 
that too on receipt of such a request from the State 
Government concerned to designate all or any of the 
members of the Bench or Benches of the Central Adminis-
trative Tribunal functioning in that state as members 
of the Bench or Benches of the State Administrative 
Tribunal for that State. In other words, the discretion 
to designate all or any of the members of the State 
Administrative Tribunal or, as the case may be all or ' 
any of the members of the Central Administrative Tribunal 
8. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 
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as such vests in the Central Government. The discretion 
is to be exercised with the concurrence of or on receipt 
of such a request from the State Government concerned 
and by notification. And as per the provisions of sub-
section (6) of Section (4), the notification so issued 
must also provide for the apportionment of the expendi-
ture in connection with the members common to the Central 
Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunal 
and such other incidental, supplemental and consequential 
provisions not inconsistent with the Act as may be deemed 
necessary or expedient. Upon such designation, the 
Bench or Benches of the State Administrative Tribunal 
or, as the case may be, the Bench or Benches of the 
Central Administrative Tribunal are deemed to be the 
Central Administrtive Tribunal or the State Adminis-
trative Tribunal for that state in all respects. 
DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIBUNALS 
Act has been brought into force with effect from 
1st July, 1985 in so far as it relates to the Central 
Administrative Tribunal. 
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 
(1) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985 
and in supersession of the earlier Notification the 
Central Government has established the Central Adminis-
trative Tribunal with effect the 1st day of November, 
1985, which shall also be the 'appointed day' within 
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the meaning of clause (c) of section 3 of the Act. 
COMPOSITION OF TRIBUNAL AND THEIR BENCHES -
The question of composition of Tribunals and 
Benches thereof is dealt with under Section 5 of the 
Act. According to sub-section(1), each Tribunal is to 
consist of a Chairman and such number of vice Chairman 
and Judicial and Administrative Members as the appro-
priate Government may deem fit. However, subject to 
the other provisions of the Act, the Jurisdiction, 
powers and authority of the Tribunal may be exercised 
by Benches of such Tribunal. According to sub-section(2) 
of Sections of the Act, a Bench has to consist of one 
Administrative Member. This, of course, is again 
subject to the other provisions of the Act. The 
expressions, "Administrative Member" and "Judicial 
Member" have also been defined in clauses (a) and 
(i) of Section 3 of the Act. The expression, "Adminis-
trative Member has been defined to mean a Member of a 
Tribunal appointed, as such under the Act and includes 
the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman who possesses any of 
the qualifications specified in sub-section (3) of 
Section 6 of the Act. Sub Section (4) gives discretion 
to the chairman to discharge the functions of the 
Judicial Member or, as the case may be, the Administra-
tive Member of any other Bench in Addition to dischar-
ging the functions of the Judicial Member or the 
36 
Administrative Member of the Bench to which he is appointed. 
The Chairman is also competent under Sub-Section (c) to 
transfer the Judicial Member or the Administrative 
Member, as the case may be of another Bench and to issue 
such general or special orders, having regard to the 
nature of the questions involved, that the case or cases 
be decided by a Bench composed of more than two Members, 
subject, of course, that every Bench constituted in 
pursuance of this clause shall include at least one 
judicial Member and one Administrative Member. Accord 
ing to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act, it is 
also competent for the chairman or any other member 
authorised by him to function as a bench consisting of 
a single Member and exercise the jurisdiction, powers 
and authority of the Tribunal in respect of such 
classes of cases or such matters pertaining to such 
classes of cases as the Chairman may b'y general or 
special order specify. However, if at any stage of 
the hearing of any such case or matter it appears to 
the Chairman or such Member that the case or matter is 
of such a nature that it ought to be heard by a Bench 
consisting of two Members, the case or matter may be 
transferred by theChairman or, as the case may be, 
referred to him for transfer to such Bench as the 
Chairman may deem fit. In Sampath Kumar the Supreme 
Court directed that each Bench of the Tribunal will 
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consist of one Judicial Member and one non-Judicial 
Member and in case of difference of opinion between 
them, the case shall be referred for decision to the 
Chairman of the Tribunal. 
SITTING OF TRIBUNAL AND BENCHES. 
Section 5(7) of the Act contemplates the 
power of the appropriate Government to specify the 
places at which the Benches shall ordinarily sit. It 
lays down that subject to the other provisions of the 
Act, the places at which the Benches shall ordinarily 
sit shall be such as the appropriate Government 
may specify by notification. This provision has to 
be read with sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act 
which gives power to the Tribunal to regulate its own 
procedure including the fixing of places and times of 
its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or 
in private. This provision in section 22(1) has obvi-
ously been made in order to enable the Tribunal or 
Benches thereof to hold its sitting in private for 
deciding cases of which the facts, if disclosed, may 
inquire interest of the public. Therefore, apart from 
the places as have been specified by the appropriate 
10. S.P. Sampath Kumar and others V. Union of India 
and others, A.I.R. 1986 S.C.I. 
0 
Government where the Tribunal or Benches thereof 
shall ordinarily sit for holding inquiry, power 
has been given to the Tribunal as well to fix 
places of its inquiry and decide whether to sit in 
public or in private. The basic principle of 
administration of Justice is that the Courts 
should come closer to the people and not run for 
away from them. 
11. S.P. Sampth Kumar and others V. Union of India 
and others. AIR 1986 SC 1. 
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CHAPTER - III 
[Appointment and Removal of Chairman Vice Chairman] 
Members and other Staff.. 
Each tribunal will consist of a Chairman and 
such number of Vice-chairman and other members as 
the appropriate government may deem fit. The Central 
Administrative Tribunal is contemplated to be divided 
into a 'Principal Bench' and 'Additional Bench' so 
that there could be benches in different parts of 
the country. Ordinarily, the principal Bench shall be 
presided over by the Chairman of the Tribunal and an 
Additional Bench by Vice-Chairman. The principal Bench 
is not contemplated to be an appellate bench. It would 
be exercising concurrent Jurisdiction with Additional 
Benches. 
9L!ALIFICATI0NS_F0R_APP0INTMENT -
In order to be eligible to be appointed as 
Chairman or Vice-chairman or a member of any tribunal, 
it is not necessary that one must have legal background 
To begin with, a person who is or has been a judge of 
a High Court or has held for at least two years the 
post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any 
other post under the Central of a State Government 
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carrying the same scale of pay as that of Secretary 
to the Government of India can be appointed as 
Chairman or Vice-chairman . To be appointed as 
a member of a tribunal, one may be a sitting or retired 
or who is qualified to be a High Court Judge or who has 
been for at least two years Additional Secretary or 
for three years Joint Secretary to the Government of 
India or any other post under the Government of India 
2 
or a State Government carrying the same scale of pay. 
A sitting judge is less likely to accept the chairman-
ship or Vice-chairmanship of a Tribunal. The only 
additional advantage to a judge would be that he would 
be able to continue in that position upto 65 years of 
age whereas as a High Court judge, he would have 
3 
retired at the age of 62. This too wiould be possible 
provided he is offered this position at an age of 60 so 
that he could avail a full term of 5 years. In case 
it is done at the age of 57-58,. he would complete his 
5 years around the same time as he would have retired 
as a High Court Judge. This being so, it is doubtful 
whether a sitting judge would at all prefer an assign-
ment with the tribunal. In case of membership of a 
1. Section 6(1) and (2) of Administrative Tribunals 
Act 1985. 
2. Section 6 (3) A.T.A. 1985. 
3. Constitution of India Article 217 Sec.8. ATA 1985 
1 
tribunal, even this gain or three years will not be 
available in view of the fact that a member can conti-
nue only upto the age of 62 years. It may not be 
purposeful to engage retired judges as chairman or 
vice chairman of tribunals since they would not be in 
a position to complete a term of 5 years. It would be 
a futile exercise to appoint them for a short period 
of 2 to 3 years. Section 6(3)(a) of the Administrative 
Tribunals Act, 1985 even makes the retired judges 
qualified to be appointed as member of a tribunal. 
This provison is in diiect conflict with section 8(b) 
of the Act which provides that one can continue to be a 
member upto the age of 62 years. The retiring age of 
a Hi^ h_CfiAirt Jud£e__i_s,_62--y-eaxs . In fa^t,- -a -retired 
judge cannot be appointe^^^ a_member of _a tri buna 1 in 
view of section 8(b) . The only possibility is that if 
someone resigns as a judge of a High Court before attain-
ing the age of 62 years, he could be appointed as a 
member of a tribunal. But such examples are going to be 
very rare. In fact, it may provide an opening to those 
judges who are proposed to be transferred from one High 
Court to another. If such a judge does not wish to move 
5. Section 8(B) 
6. Section 8(b) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 
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out of that place, he may succeed in getting an appoint-
ment with the tribunal and thereby continue to stay at 
that place. One good provision in the Act in tliis 
regard is that even those who are qualified to be 
appointed as High Court judges can be appointed as members 
of a tribunal. By this process, such lawyers who may have 
done well in "Service matters" could be appointed as 
members of a tribunal. Their association could prove 
useful in making the tribunals effective and efficient. 
Here again one would encounter a problem. A Lawyer who 
is doing well in profession may not at all want to be 
a member of a tribunal,has not been made eligible for 
chairmanship or vice-chairmanship directly. It is yet 
to be seen whether the government is at all keen or not 
to associate legal experts with tribunal. Under the 
scheme of the Act, there is nothing which prevents the 
government in having only administrators as Chairman, 
Vice-chairman and members of tribunals. It would be 
better if persons both/will/legal and administrative 
experience are associated with tribunals. Those who are 
qualified to be appointed as judges of High Courts should 
also be made eligible to be appointed directly as Chairman 
or Vice-chairman of tribunals. Legal background is in a 
way essential since the tribunals would be administering 
fundamental rights and other legal rights. This would 
7. Section 6(3)(A) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 
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help in providing a sound base to tribunals. It needs 
to be understood that for the successful functioning of 
Administrative Tribunals, people must have confidence 
and trust in the impartiality and independence of 
tribunals. If more of administrators are going to 
dominate the tribunals, it would create a feeling that 
these tribunals are appendages of the government, that 
they are going to toe the line of the government and 
that there would be no security of service. During the 
last 35 years of our constitution, a jurisprudence of 
'Fairness' and 'Reasonableness' has developed in the 
context of Articles 14, 16 and 311 vis-a-vis the 
government servants. This jurisprudence will have to 
be carried forward by the tribunals. To meet this 
challenge, it is imperative that the Tribunals must be 
put on sound footing by appointing such persons who 
would inspire confidence of the people. What is vital 
is who would man these bodies? Utmost care in this 
regard would be necessary. The future of Administrative 
Tribunals would be largely linked with this one important 
factor. 
PROCEDURE FOR 'APPOINTMENT 
The Chairman, Vice-chairman and every other 
member of the Central Administrative Tribunal shall be 
Q 
appointed by the President. The appointments to 
8. Section 6(4) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 
i\ 
State Administrative Tribunals and Joint Administrative 
Tribunals shall also be made by the President but after 
9 
consultation with the concerned Governor or Governors. 
There is no statutory requirement to consult the Chief 
Justice of a High Court while considering the names 
of those who are judges or have been judges or are quali-
fied to be appointed as judges. This would provide a 
free hand to the government to choose persons of its 
choice. One may argue, why not? But the minus point 
in it cannot be ignored altogether. If the government 
would so like, it would pack the tribunals with its 
confidents. The snag in it will be, will the people 
have confidence in such Tribunals? Another possibility 
can not be ruled out that the government may prefer to 
accommodate its trusted retired civil servants. It would 
be a bonanza for the civil servants on the eve of their 
retirement to continue in service for another period of 
five years with the tribunal after attaining the age of 
fifty eight. Under the French Administrative Courts 
System, appointments are made through a national compe-
titive examination. It may be worthwhile to consider to 
constitute Indian Administrative Tribunal Service. The 
size of India is big. This obviously means that we would 
9. Section 6(5) and (6) of ATA 1985 
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need a good number of persons for the functioning of these 
tribunals. It would be useful to pick up young persons. 
They should be given extensive training. They should be 
prepared well for the task that they would be required to 
undertake. Ultimately, it would help in raising efficient 
administrative judges. If this system could work in Frace 
now for almost two hundred years, there seems to be no 
reason that it would not work in India. 
CONTINGENCIES IN WHICH GOVERNMENT CAN AUTHORISE VICE-
CHAIRMAN TO ACT AS CHAIRMAN. 
In the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of 
the Chairman by reason of his death, resignation or 
otherwise, the appropriate Government has been conferred 
the power by sub-section (1) of Section 7 to authorise, 
by notification, the Vice-Chairman or, as the case may 
be , such one of the Vice-Chairman, to act as the Chairman 
until the date on which a. new Chairman, appointed in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act to fill such 
vacancy, enters upon his office. When the Chairman is 
a 
unable to discharge his functions owing to Absence, illness 
or any other cause, the appropriate Government is conferred 
power by sub-section (2) of Section 7 to authorise, by 
notification in this behalf, the Vice-Chairman or as 
10. Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 
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the case may be, such one of the Vice-chairman until 
the date on which the Chairman resumes his duties. 
TERMS OF OFFICE -
The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of 
the Tribunal are entrusted with important functions which 
were formerly being performed by High Courts. In order 
that such Chairman, Vice-chairman or members of the 
Tribunal may be able to discharge those functions with-
out fear or favour and their independence in meeting 
out even-handed justice may not be impaired, it was 
desirable that they must enjoy security of tenure. The 
very object of creating such Tribunal and ensuring 
impartial justice to such persons seeking redress would 
be completely defeated, if they do not enjoy security of 
tenure. To achieve this object. Section 8 was enacted 
by the Legislature. It ensures security of tenure to 
the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members of the 
Tribunal. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members 
of the Tribunal shall hold office as such for a term of 
five years from the date on which he attains the age of 
sixty-five years or sixty-two years as prescribed in 
the provision. A close scrutiny of Section 8 of the Act 
reveals that the fact that a member of the Tribunal has 
attained the age of superannuation prescribed in the 
service which was the source from which he was drawn is 
47 
I r r c l o v n n t f o r I lie p u r p o f i m i o f d c I r-r in 1 n 1 iig Liu? LcMiiiif 
of his membership of the tribunal. 
Therefore, the age of retirement relating to the 
service which is the source from which a Chairman, Vice-
Chairraan or member of the Tribunal is drawn shall have 
no bearing on his continuance in the Tribunal so long 
as he is not withdrawn from that post by virtue of some 
other power. The provisions of Section 8 ensure a 
tenure o.f office for the Chairman or Vice-chairman for a 
period' of five years from the date such Chairman or 
Vice-chairman enters upon his office provided he does 
not attain the age of sixty-five years during this period 
of five years. A Chairman orVice-Chairman shall become 
disqualified to hold the office the moment he attains 
the age of sixty five years. Same is the position in 
regard to the appointment of an additional Secretary 
to the Government of India as a member of the Tribunal. 
Such a person"shall continue to hold office as member of 
the Tribunal till he attains the age of sixty-two years 
irrespective of the fact that he has attained the age of 
58 years prescribed for his superannuation as Additional 
Secretary to the Government of India. 
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REMOVAL OF CHAIRMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN ETC. 
The power to remove the Chairman, Vice-chaixfflB.n 
or any other member has been vested with the President. 
He can do so on the ground of proven misbehaviour or 
incapacity after an enquiry has been made by a judge 
of the Supreme Court in which he is to be informed of the 
charge;against him and to be given a reasonable opportu-
nity of being heard in respect of the charge or charges. 
This ensures sufficient security. They would not be 
unecessarily exposed to government actions. They would 
not be working under constant fear of removal. This is 
essential because in every case, the government action 
would be in question before the Tribunal. Therefore, the 
Tribunals must be free from routine government controls. 
Chairman, Vice-chairman and members of tribunals have been 
debarred from further employment either under the Government 
1 2 
of India or the government of a State. Understandably, 
there is no bar against a member being appointed as Vice-
Chairman or Chairman of the Tribunal Act prescribes the 
procedure for resignation of the Chairman, Vice-chairman or 
other member of the Tribunal. It enables the Chairman, 
Vice-chairman or other Member of the Administrative Tribunal 
11. Section 9(2) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 
12. Section 11 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 
to resign his office by notice in writing under his hand 
addressed to the President of India. It lays down that 
the Chairman, Vice Chairman or other Member shall continue 
to hold office until the expiry of three months from the 
date of receipt of such notice by the President or until 
a person duly appointed as his successor enters upon his 
office or until the expiry of his term of office, which-
ever is the earliest or unless he is permitted by the 
President to relinquish his office sooner. 
STAFF OF THE TRIBUNAL -
The obligation to provide the staff to a Tribunal 
is that of the appropriate Government. It follows that 
the Tribunals shall not be having any permanent staff of 
their own but they will be assisted in the discharge of 
their duties by such staff as may be provided to them by 
the appropriate Government. However, under sub-section(1 A) 
of Section 13, the office and other employees of a Tribunal 
are to discharge their functions under the general 
superintendence of the Chairman 13 
13. By notification dated 31st October, 1985 the 
Central Government has made the Central Administrative 
Tribunal Staff (conditions of service) Rules, 1985. 
(ATR 1986 Junaral Section, 45.) 
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CHAPTER - IV 
ADJUDICATING PROCESS 
The procedures to be followed by a Tribunal 
in administration of -its business may sometimes be 
fully or partially prescribed in statute itself 
constituting the Tribunals. To that extent the 
Tribunal shall be bound to follow the prescribed 
procedure. But as the very purpose of creating a 
Tribunal is to provide speedy justice by cutting 
short the procedures to the extent necessary, and also 
because all the future exigencies may not be fore-
seeable by the law making authority it may be left to 
the Tribunal to formulate its own procedure. In doing 
so they have ,to follow some minimum of the requirements 
in all the cases and more than that may depend upon 
the circumstances of the case or the nature of business 
transacted by the Tribunals. 
Chapter IV of the Administrative Tribunal Act 
contains the procedure. The matter can be initiated 
before a Tribunal by making an application for the 
redressal of grievance. Every application shall be 
accompanied by such documents or other evidence and 
by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) 
1. Section 19(1) Ad.Tr. Act. 1985. 
5J 
as may be prescribed by the Central Government. The 
Tribunal before whom the application has been made 
if satisfied that the requirements under the Act 
in relation to such application have been complied 
with, it may admit such application. But if it is 
3 
not satisfied, it may reject the application summarily. 
The Tribunals will have to handle this stage of the 
proceeding with lot of caution. If the application is 
rejected at this stage, this would mean the end of 
the matter even without considering the merits of the 
matter. The tribunals are not expected to admit an 
application unless they are satisfied, that the applicant 
had availed of all the remedies available to him under 
the relevant service rules. 
This would also include the making of any 
administrative appeal or representation. The considera-
tion of such appeals and representations is normally 
delayed. This does not mean that till the competent 
authority disposes the matter, the party will have no 
right to make an application to a tribunal. The Act 
provides that if a period of six months has expired 
after the appeal was preferred or representation was 
2.Section 19(2) Ad. Tr. Act. 85 
3. Section 19(3) Ad. Tr. Act. 85 
4. Section 20(1). 
made and no order has been made, he would have the 
right to make an application before the Tribunal. 
This should atleast expedite the consideration of 
appeals and representations by the Government. It 
is possible that in a number of cases, the wrong may be 
rectified at this level only. In fact, the constitution 
in Article 350 guarantees to every person the right 
to make a representation for the redress of grievance 
to a competent authority. This entails a constitutional 
obligation on the part of the government to consider the 
matter and take a decision without unreasonable delay. 
Otherwise, the very purpose of the constitutional right 
is defeated. The Act and the constitution coupled 
together may make this provision meaningful. 
DOCTRINE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN TRIBUNAL 
Tribunals have not been made bound by the 
procedure laid down in the code of Civil Procedure, 
1908. In their working, they shall be guided by 
principles of natural justice. Rules of natural 
justice have come to play a unique role in the develop-
ment of administrative jurisprudence. The development 
of administrative law in India in the post-internal 
5.Section 20(2)(b) Ad.Tr.Act 
6.Section 22(1). Ad.Tr.Act. 
emergency era is primarily based upon the rules 
of natural justice. The parliament has done well 
in recognising the need of natural justice rules in 
the operation of tribunals. This will help the 
Tribunals in moulding their procedure keeping in 
view the circumstances of a situation. 
The principles of natural justice seeks to 
7 
provide fair, impartial and reasonable justice. v 
Court and jurist have tended to recognise them and 
even to define thera when necessary. These principles 
have never been codified and hence there is a 
flexibility in the doctrine of natural justice 
that remains its principal quality. The doctrine 
rests on the assumption that whatever is fair and 
reasonable to the parties concerned in a dispute comes 
under the principles of natural justice. The first 
and foremost principle of the doctrine is that 
(Nemo judex in causa sua) a man can't act as a judge 
o 
in his own cause. Bias arising from strong and 
sincere conviction as to public policy may operate as 
7. Singh S.S. Administration of Natural Justice 
in India Delhi, 1986, P. 231-38. 
8. Report of the Committee on Minister's Powers, 
Cmd 4060. 
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a more serious disqualification than pecuniary 
interest. The second principle is that (Audi alteram 
partem) no party should be condemned without being 
heard. If the right of a party to be heard is to 
be meaningful, he must know in good time, the case 
made out against him. Furthermore, a party has the 
right to know the reasons for a judgement handed 
down, be it judicial or quasi-judicial.-
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Natural justice has been variously defined 
and described. It is pithily said to be a natural 
sense of what is right and wrong. Indeed, natural 
justice is a pervasive fact of secular law wherein 
a spiritual touch enlivens the legislation, adminis-
tration and adjudication to make fairness a creed 
of life. It has many hues and shades and save where 
valid law excludes, natural justice applies when people 
are affected by acts of authority. It is backbone 
of healthy government, recognised from times immemorial, 
g 
and not a mystic testament of judgemade law. In its 
report on administrative tribunals and enquiries, the 
Franks Committee emphasised the need to enjur.e 
openness, fairness and impartiality in the procedures 
Tim z_zz __ri ^-^ 
9. Mohindar Singh Gill V, Chief Election Commissioner, 
New Delhi (1978 S.C.R. 272. Approved in M/s Laxmi 
Khandsari V. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 873 
P. 892 
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of the tribunals set up by Parliament 10 The Law 
Commission of India expresses thfe same view in its 
Fourteenth Report. The Supreme Court also states 
that the object of the principles of natural justice 
is to secure justice or, to put it negatively, to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
It is indeed valid to insist on the observance 
of natural justice in the area of administrative 
decision-making. This would help to avoid devaluation 
of the principle by administrators who unfortunately 
show insensitivity to the rationale of audi alteram 
13 
partem, The judicial policy has now been to 
eliminate the old distinction between a judicial act 
14 
and an adrainistrtive act. The law must, therefore, 
be taken as well settled now that even in an adminis-
trative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, 
the doctrine of natural Justice mustbo Iiold uppilcable 15 
10.Government of the United Kingdom, Committee on 
administrative Tribunals and enquiries. Report, 
July 1957. 
11.Government of India, Ministry of Law, Fourteenth 
Report of the Law Commission (New Delhi) P. 694. 
12. A.K. Kraipak V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C.150 
13.Supra Note 16. 
14. S.L. Kapoor V. Jagmohan (1980), S.C.C. 379. 
15. Meneka Gandhi V. Union of India (1978) 2, S.C.R.621 
approved in M/s Laxmi Khandsari V. State of U.P. 
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 873. 
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The foregoing remarks should also indicate 
that the concept of natural justice cannot be 
straitjacketed. The Supreme Court does not look 
for definitions or standards of natural justice 
from various decisions and then attempt to apply the 
same to a given case. It looks into the overall 
fairness of the mode, manner and material of the 
outcome of an administrative action. However, one 
of the most important points that must be kept in 
mind in every case is that, every person concerned 
should have a resonable opportunity to present his 
side; another important point is that the adminis-
trative authority concerned should act reasonably 
fairly, and impartially. The purpose of the 
principle, insofar as administrative officers are 
concerned, is to impress upon them their duty to 
act fairly . 
Applying the principle to the tribunals the 
Supreme Court has put the matter succinctly. It is 
against all canons of natural justice that a tribunal 
should arrive at a finding of far-reaching conse-
quences without giving an opportunity to explain 
to the persons who would be affected by such findings 
16. Kesva Mills Co.Ltd. V. Union of India A.I.R. 
1973 S.C. 389. 
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The court makes a qualification when it states that 
the rules of natural justice have to be inferred from 
the nature of the tribunal, the scope of its inquiry, 
and the statutory rules of procedure laid down by the 
law for carrying out of objectives of the statute. 
In short, it may be stated that the principle 
of natural justice has been expounded and expanded^ .,-
from time to time by judicial precedents handed down 
by the Supreme Court of India. Initially, the principle 
of natural justice was applicable only to judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies and not to administrative bodies 
or tribunals. The latter have now been brought within 
the fold of this doctrine for administrative actions 
taken, except when the orders are purely ministerial 
in character or routinely administrative. 
Natural Justice is not something hard and fast 
and fixed in nature. The rules of natural justice are 
adjustable. They are adaptable to the situation. They 
17 -
are faijl_J>_ia_X_iri action. J/ They do not apply in the 
same manner to situations which are not alike. Justice 
D.P. Madon has recently held: 
17. Ridge V. Baldwin (1961) 1 All.E.R. 523 and 
Menka Gandhi V. Union of India A.I.R. 1978 
SC 547. 
Tlicsc rules arc noL cusL in u rigid mould 
nor can they be put in a legal strait-Jacket. They 
are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be 
adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules 
and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has 
to decide a particular matter and the rules by which 
1 Q 
such Tribunal is governed. 
The Tribunal is entitled to admit in evidence, 
in lieu of any original document, a copy thereof 
attested by a Gazetted Officer. It can decide cases 
on the basis of evidence on affidavits and need not 
take oral evidence. It has wide power of summoning 
the original document from theGovernment. It is 
entitled to give relief which may be warranted on 
19 the facts of a case before it. The remedy before the 
Tribunal is expeditious. A Tribunal is not hedged in 
by technicalities and can do justice by getting the 
20 
original records from the Government. The wide 
powers given to the Tribunals to follow their own 
procedure are aimed at mitigating the rigours of the 
technicalities of the procedural law for achieving 
18. Union of India V. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 S.C.C.39I 
19. Rameshraya Yadav and etc. V. State of U.P.,1982 
Lab. IC 826 (All HC-DB) 
20. Ibid. 
21 
expeditious investigation. The Tribunals are 
guided by the rules made by the Central Government. 
It is enjoined upon them to decide the applications 
as expeditiously as possible after perusing documents 
and written representations and after hearing of oral 
22 
arguments as may be advanced. 
Except to the extent specified in sub-section 
(3) of Section 22 of the Act and the relevant rules, 
the provisions of the code of Civil proced ure 1 9.,QL8_.„ 
are not applicable to proceedings before the Tribunals 
The provisions of Indian evidence Act, 1872 except 
Sections 123 and 124 requisitioning any public record 
or document or copy of such record or document from 
any office, in their strict sense, too, do not apply 
to proceedings before the Tribunals. Nevertheless, 
the Tribunals have to exercise their discretion in a 
judicial manner, without caprice and according to the 
general principles of law and rules of natural justice 
The applicant and respondent are entitled to 
appear in person as also through legal practitioners 
before the Tribunals. Rules 3 to 25 of the Central 
23 
21.Metal Febricators (India) V. B.D. Gupta, 1975 Lab 
C 1707 at 1710 (Delhi H.C.) 
22.Ibid. 
23,Harchura Tea Estate V. Labour Appellate Tribunal 
1961 I LLJ 175 at 177 (Cal. H.C.) 
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Administrative Tribunals (Procedure) rules, 1985 and 
the forms prescribed thereunder lay down the procedure 
of the Tribunal. Form I prescribed by rule A is more 
or less analogous to a writ petition and the reply to 
be filed would take more or less the form of a written 
statement. A,ny applicnt appearing before these 
Tribunals must make a claim or demur a claim of the 
other side. Where the parties are at variance, it is 
open to the Tribunals to frame an issue and dispose 
it of as a preliminary issue. When there is a burden 
upon a party to piove or establish the fact so as to 
invite a decision in its favour, it has to lead 
evidence. Obligation of leading evidence to establish 
an allegation or evertment made by a party is on the 
party making such allegation or evidence. It must seek 
an opportunity to lead evidence. But evidence can be 
led only in support of the contentions pleaded. If 
there is no pleading raising a contention, there is no 
question of substantiating such a non-existing conten-
tion by evidence. Though pleadings before such Tribunals 
have not to be read strictly, it is equally true that 
pleadings must be such as to give sufficient notice to 
24 
other party of the case it is called upon the meet. 
24. Tin Printers (P) Ltd., V. I.T., 1967 II LLJ 677 
at 680-81 (Pb. & Hr. H.C.). 
Til is principle was cited with approval by the 
25 Supreme Court in another case. Under sub-section(1) 
of Section 2 2 n Tribunal in not hound l)y tho ]>r oc CMI u r (> 
laid down in the code of Civil Procedure but is euided 
by the principles of natural justice and the rules ' 
made by the Central Government. It has the power to 
regulate its own procedure including the fixing of 
places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether 
to sit in public or in private. It shall decide every 
application as expeditiously as possible, ordinarily 
on a perusal of documents and written representations 
and after hearing oral arguments, as may be advanced. 
For purposes of holding inquiry, it has the same 
powers as are vested in a civil court under the code of 
Civil Procedure while trying a suit in respect of 
summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and 
examining him on oath; requiring the discovery and 
production of documents; receiving evidence on affi-
davits; requisitioning any public record or document 
or copy of such record or document from any office, 
issueing commission for the examination of witnesses or, 
documents; reviewing its decisions; dismissing a repre-
sentation for default or deciding it ex-parte; setting 
aside any order of dismissal of any representation for 
25. Shankar Chakraworty V. Britania Biscuit Co.Ltd., 
1979 II LLJ 194 at 207 (S.C.). 
9 
default or any order passed by it ex-parte; it has the 
discretion to adjourn or hear and decide the application 
ex-par te ; gra n t adjournment etc. Therefore, tlie Tribunals 
constituted under the Act have all the trappings of a 
Court of Law. 
It is the duty of the Tribunal to act fairly 
between the parties and to hear and determine the appli-
cation as judge upon the evidence, oral and documentary, 
advanced before it. If it allows a prayer from one 
party, it should not refuse a similar prayer by the other 
27 party. It should endeavour to exclude from his mind 
any previous personal knowledge or pre-conceived notice 
of the case. Both parties should be present when the 
hearing is commenced unless the case has taken such a 
course as to justify the Tribunal in proceeding ex-parte. 
Subject to this exception, the case should be opened 
and the evidence taken in the presence of both the 
parties. Rule 14 of the Central Administrative Tribunals 
(Procedure) Rules, 1985 enjoins upon the Tribunal to 
decide the application on a perusal of documents and 
written representations and after hearing of oral 
arguments, as may be advanced on the date fixed, or any 
26. Shanker Chakraworty V. Britania Bi-!cuits Co.Ltd. 1979 
II LLJ 194 at 208 S.C. (These cases were decided under 
the different statute but the pricniples enunciated 
therein will apply with equal force to the cases under 
this Act). 
27. Pheros & Co.(P) Ltd. V. Labour Court, 1971 Lab. IC 
600 at 603 ( A S P HC-DB). 
other date to which the hearing could be adjourned. 
It should allow the applicant and the respondent to 
give oral arguments and after holding an enquiry in 
in terras of sub-section (3) of Section 22 or on the 
conclusion of oral arguments as required under sub-rules 
(1) and (2), the Tribunal shall decide the application. 
The procedure to be followed by the Tribunal need not 
be exclusively adversative. The Tribunal itself could 
investigate how far the action taken is in accordance 
with the Rules. It could adopt inquisitorial procedure 
also to meet the ends of justice, nevertheless it does 
not offend the principles of natural justice. 
To assist the Tribunals to work without handicaps, 
they have been authorised to exercise the same jurisdic-
tion and power in respect of contempt of itself as a 
High Court has. The provisions of the contempt of 
courts Act, 1971 have been made applicable in this 
O Q 
regard. This helps the Tribunals in ensuring that they 
are taken seriously and that their orders are not 
ignored or flouted. 
28. Section 17 of Ad. Tr. Act. 1985 
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CHAPTER - V 
Justice does not change its essential character 
and meaning when administered through an agency other 
than a court. The basic purpose of making justice 
available to the citizens led to the proliferation 
of tribunals (as distinct from the state or its various 
instrumentalities), a consequence, as stated earlier, 
of the exigencies of a welfare state. Thes-e tribunals, 
although not conceded to be courts of law, are taken 
for all practical purposes to have the trappings of a 
court. Now, therefore we shall attempt to ascertain 
the naturel and extent of the jurisdiction of the tribu-
nals set up as a system of justice in the country, and 
shall discuss the modes of control exercised over them 
by the established judicial authorities under the 
constitution. 
The jurisdiction, powers and a^ tho£jiJty of the 
Tribunals are dealt within Chapter IV & V. j)f the_ 
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. 
Section 14 of the Act provides that save as 
otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Adminis-
trative Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction. 
65 
powers and authority exercisable by all courts 
immediately before the first day of November, 1985 
except the Supreme Court in relation to service 
matters and persons specified therein. The only 
jurisdiction spared by the Act is that of the 
Supreme Court. Except the power of the Supreme Court 
the Administrative Tribunal has been conferred with 
all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable 
by all courts immediately before the 1st day of Nov., 
1985 in relation to service matters and posts in 
relation to persons specified in the Act. 
Thus the Tribunals can be vested with complete 
powers regarding recruitments, matters related with 
recruitment and conditions of service of the persons 
mentioned in the Section. Any case which could be 
referred or the cognizance of which could be taken by 
any court on the "appointed day" can not be referred 
to or be taken up by the Tribunals. This is a very 
vast and exhaustive jurisdiction vested in the Tribunals 
Section 15 is similar to section 14 which deals with 
the Central Administrative Tribunals., It gives all 
jurisdiction powers and authority to the state Adminis-
trative Tribunal which is vested in any of the courts, 
l.Laxmi Chand V. UOI & Ors. ATR 1986 CAT P. 111. 
before the Act became applicable to such state, in 
relation to recruitments and matters connected there-
with and the service matters of all the employees of 
the State Govt, or all those holding a civil post, or 
working in connection with the affairs of the State 
Government . Similar matters of employees working in 
local bodies, authorities, corporations and societies 
owned or controlled by the state government may also 
be covered by the State Administrative Tribunals from 
a date which may be notified by the govts. These 
provisions shall however be subject to any other provi-
sions of the Act. 
Sub-section (4) of the sec.'IS relates to removal 
of doubts and provides that the authority, powers and 
jurisdiction of a State Administrative Tribunal extend 
to any matter in relation to which the Central Administra-
tive Tribunals shall not have the jurisdiction. 
The section 16 provides that the joint tribunal in 
two or more states shall have the same jurisdiction, 
authority and powers as the State Administrative Tribunals 
in those States would have thus the joint Administrative 
Tribunal is like any other State Administrative Tribunal 
and its powers etc. will be the same as given in section 
15 of the Act. 
So Lho AcL, on Llie one liuiid d i sq uu i i I'i os nil 
courts, except the Supreme Court, from exercising any 
jurisdiction, power and authority in service matters 
falling within the purview of these tribunals, and on 
^ — • _ _. — — - — • - j 
the other hand, it vests in the Central Administrative 
Tribunals, State Administrative Tribunals and Joint 
Administrative Tribuna.ls all the jurisdiction, powers 
and authority exercisable immedj.ately before that daj 
by all courts ^jc,££4l-L—tJie Supreme Court in the following 
matters. 
1. Recruitment and matters concerning recuritment to 
any (i) All India Service; (ii) Civil Service of 
the Union; (iii) Civil Services of the states; or 
(iv) Civil post under the state. 
2. All service matters concerning a member of any 
all-India Service, a non member of All India Service who 
has been appointed to any civil service of the Union or 
civil post under the Union of any civilian appointed to 
any defence service or post connected with the defence 
or a person appointed to any civil service of the State 
or any civil post under the state. 
3. All service matters pertaining to services of a 
person belonging to the Central Civil Services whose 
service have been placed by a State Government, any local 
or other authority, or any corporation is controlled by 
the Central Government of the State Govermient.^ 
Therefore, a proper knowledge of the ambit of 
jurisdiction, powers and authority of administrative 
tribunals makes it necessary to have a resume of the 
jurisdiction powers and authority exercisable by all 
courts, except the Supreme court, immediately before 
the commencement of the Act in the respective recruit-
ment and service matters. The expression "all courts'" 
used in the Act, expressly save Supreme Court, 
includes ordinary civil courts and High Courts. 
Jurisdiction, powers and authority of civil 
courts in service matters before the commencement of the 
Act included (a) trial of all civil suits unless barred 
2 
expressly or impliedly, (b) grant of declarations or 
injunction, temporary, perpetual or mandatory; and 
(c) award of damages in lieu of or in addition to 
3 
injunction. Civil Courts, prior to the Act, therefore, 
could issue orders of declaration and/or consequential 
relief in cases of termination, salary, discharge, 
reversion or compulsory retirement in violation of the 
constitutional guarantee of tenure of service (A.311) 
in violation of rules with respect to recruitment, tenure 
and other conditions of service (Articles 14 to 16), 
2. S. 9 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 
3. Ss. 34, 36, 39, Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
Order xxxix C.P.C. (Procedure to grant temporary 
injunction.. 
imposition of unreasonable penalties, etc. In otlier 
words a public servant could invoke iurisdiction, power 
and authority of a civil court in cases of adverse 
orders passed by the authorities in breach of statutory 
rule or administrative instruction. Validity of an 
order though apparently in conformity with the statutory 
rules or administrative instructions, can be challenged 
on a number of Grounds. 
To mention a few, (1) its inconsistency with the 
constitution on account of breach of the fundamental 
rights or any other constitutional provision securing 
guarantee of tenure of service etc. (2) excessive dele-
gation of legislative powers; (3) its inconsistency with 
the parent statute^ (4) want of excess of the statuory 
authority ;^(5) abuse of powers in passing impugned orders;\ 
(6) passing of an orders on irrelevant considerations or 
overlooking relevant ones; (7) non compliance with the 
conditions precedent to the passing of the orders etc."" 
Similarly, recruitment to a post may be challenged in the 
court on the ground that it was made arbitrarily or in 
violation of the right to equality enshrined in articles 
14 to 16 or rules or instruction 4; . In such situations 
the aggrieved party could either institute a civil suit 
for the stay or pray for appropriate writ, order or 
direction under Article 226 or 32 of the constitution. 
4. Article 14 to 16, 309 to 312 of the Constitution. 
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The High C o u r t s , b e s i d e s t h e o r i g i n a l and 
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n s e r v i c e m a t t e r s , have 
a l s o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w and 
may i s s u e a p p r o p r i a t e o r d e r s , d i r e c t i o n s or w r i t s . 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n empowers t h e High C o u r t s as -
i s s u e to any p e r s o n or a u t h o r i t y . . . . d i r e c t i o n s , 
o r d e r s or w r i t s , i n c l u d i n g w r i t s in t h e n a t u r e of 
h a b e a s c o r p u s , mandamus, p r o h i b i t i o n , quo w a r r a n t o 
and c e r t i o r a r i or any of them, 
( a ) fo r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of [ f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s ] 
or 
(b ) fo r t h e r e d r e s s of any i n j u r y of a s u b s t a n t i a l 
n a t u r e b y r e a s o n of t h e c o n t r a v e n t i o n of any 
o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n or any 
p r o v i s i o n of any e n a c t m e n t or O r d i a n c e or any 
o t h e r , r u l e , r e g u l a t i o n , byelaw or o t h e r 
i n s t r u m e n t t h e r e u n d e r ; or 
(c)- for t h e r e d r e s s of any i n j u r y by r e a s o n of any 
i l l e g a l i t y in any p r o c e e d i n g s by or b e f o r e , a n y 
a u t h o r i t y under any p r o v i s i o n r e f e r r e d to has 
r e s u l t e d in s u b s t a n t i a l f a i l u r e of J u s t i c e . . . 
Thus , a r t i c l e 2 2 6 ( 1 ) , couched in such wide 
l a n g u a g e e n a b l e s a High Cour t no t only to c o n f i n e 
i t s e l f w i th t he power of i s s u i n g a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t or 
5. V.S.Deshpande,"Judicial Review of legislation(1975)".and 
• Expension and self r e s t r a i n t of Jud ic ia l Review.15 J . I . L . I . 
531(1973)and Henry J.Abraham, The Judic ia l Process 280(3rd Ed.1975) 
6. S.P.Sathe, Administrative Law 365 (4th ed.l984) 
M.P. Ja in , Indian Const i tut ional law 191(3rd ed. 1978) 
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order or direction for the enforcement of fundamental 
rights but also to redress any injustice caused by 
contravention of any provision of the constitution 
or enactment or any other instrument made thereunder 
and illegality in any proceedings resulting in subs-
tantial failure of iustice. Such wide language, thus 
enables the High Courts "to reach injustice wherever 
it is found" and "to mould the relief to meet the 
peculiar and complicated requirements." The Act by 
virtue of Section 1A(1), 15(1) and 16, vest^ in tjie -^ 
administrative tribunals all these powers of the ordi-
nary civil courts and the High Courts pertaining to 
service matters. The legislative intent for conferment 
of such wide powers becomes crystal clear from Section 
28 and 29 of the Act also. The latter section provides 
for automatic transfer of pending suits and proceedings 
before any court to such tribunals, while the former 
precludes any court, except the Supreme Court, indus-
trial tribunal and labour court, from exercising, any 
jurisdiction, powers and authority pertaining to speci-
fied service matters. Section 28 of the Act dealing 
with the exclusion of jurisdiction of courts, reads 
on and from which any jurisdiction', powers and authority 
7. The Comptroller V.K.S. Jagannath, (1986)(1)S.L.R .-7 1 3 
becomes exercisable under this act by a Tribunal in 
relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruit-
ment to any service or post or service matters concern-
ing members of any Service or persons appointed to any 
service or post, no court except (a) the Supreme Court; 
or (b)any industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other 
authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 19A7 or any other corresponding law for the time 
being in force shall have, or be entitled to exercise . 
any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to, 
such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment 
of such service matters. 
The term "all courts" except the Supreme Coui't 
used in sections 14(1), 15(1) and 16 read with the 
above mentioned ouster clause, primafacie, reveals the 
legislative intent to bar the High Courts, alongwith 
ordinary civil courts, from exercising any jurisdiction, 
power and authority to adjudicate disputes or entertain 
any complaints in specified service matters. It is 
further reflected in sec. 27 of the Act dealing with 
the execution of orders of a tribunal. It is particu-
larly clear from the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) 
Act, 1986, that an order of a tribunal is final and t-
cannot be ahallengedin any Court including a High Court 
Section 27 says -
Subject to tlio other provlsioiiH of or(l(>r of 
a Tribunal finally disposing of an application, or 
an appeal shall be final and shall not be called in 
question in any court (including a High Court) and 
such order shall be executed in the same manner in 
which any final order of the nature referred to in 
clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of section 20 (wheter 
or not such final order had actually been made) in 
respect of the grievance to which the application 
relates, would have been executed. 
It is not a well settled proposition in the 
area of a administrative adjudication that the legis-
lature is competent to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary 
civilcourts from the subject matters on which the 
administrative adjudicatory body has jurisdiction by 
incorporating a privative or ouster clause. A review 
Q 
of legislature on such clauses reveals that they 
affect only statory remedies such as suits, injunctions, 
^ 
declaratory actions, but not the comprehensive consti-
tutionally guaranteed judicial review contemplated by 
articles 32, 136, 226 and 227 because a statute cannot 
override the provisions of the Constitution. However 
the Act by incorporating a privative clause of very 
8, M.P. Jain, The Evolving Indian Administrative law 
197-222 (1983) 
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wide amplitude, excludes all courts, except the 
Supreme Court, from exercising any jurisdiction, 
power or authority in the specified service matters 
and matters connected therewith. 
The privative clause raises a set of questions 
of constitutional law having irapoftance, viz., (1) does 
it merely preclude the High Courts, alongwith ordinary 
civil courts, to exercise their hitherto appellate/original 
Jurisdiction in the specified service matters leaving 
aside their writ jurisdiction empowering them to issue 
appropriate writs, orders, or directions? (2) does the 
phrase "any jurisdiction, power or authority" include 
writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and thereby exclude 
such jurisdiction also? If the anser to this question is 
in the affirmative, is such an exclusion total, i.e. 
does not debar a High Court from exercising its power 
of issuing writs altogether or leave some room for the 
exercise of such jurisdiction? If yes, does the ouster 
clause, read with the jurisdictional clause in such a 
case, vest in the tribunals the authority to issue the 
writs? If yes, is it constitutionally justifiable? and 
(3) last but not the last, does it also take away the 
constitutional power of the High Courts to determine the 
constitutionality of orders in service matters? 
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The comprehensive scheme of the Act regarding, 
(i) vesting of wide jurisdiction in the tribunals, 
(ii) exclusion of jurisdiction, power and authority of 
all courts, except the Supreme Court, labour court and 
industrial tribunals in the matters falling under their 
jurisdiction coupled with the transfer of pending suits 
or proceedings of the tribunals and finality given 
to their orders and protecting them from challenges in 
any court including a High Court as stated earlier, 
reflects Parliament's intention to exclude all the juris-
diction, power and authority of a High Court including 
its power to issue appropriate writ, order or direction^ 
under Article 226 of the Constitution in the specified 
service matters. 
Ordinarily such a provision is unconstitutional 
as parliament's power to enact laws is subject to provi-
sions of the constitution. However, it is important to 
note that the object of the Act was to give effect to 
article 323 A which among other things, provides for 
exclusion of jurisdiction, power and authority of all 
9. Subramanian V. India (A.T.R. 1986 Ker. H.C. 158 
Kerala High Court takes the view that the combined 
effect of section 14(1), 28 and 29 of the Act is to 
deprive the High Court of its power to entertain and 
decide 'service matters' even in exercise of its 
power under Article 226 from 1st Nov.,1985, i.e. the 
appointed day. 
courts except the Supreme Court under article 136. The 
privative clause is almost verbafiini"! what is laid down 
in clause 2(d) of article 323 A. And section 29, dealing 
with the transfer of pending cases, reproduces, in essence, 
10. Article 
may -
(a) provide 
tribuna 
tribuna 
(b) specify 
to puni 
exercis 
(c) provide 
to limi 
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after s 
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effecti 
disposa 
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for the establishment of an administrative 
1 for the Union and a separate administrative 
1 for each State or for two or more states; 
the jurisdiction, powers (including the power 
sh for contempt) and authority which may be 
ed by each of the said tribunals; 
for the procedure (including provisions as 
tation and rules of evidence )tobe followed 
said tribunals; 
the jurisdiction of all courts, except the 
ction of the Supreme Court under article 136, 
spect to the disputes of complaints referred 
lause ( 1 ) ; 
for the transfer to each such administrative 
1 of any cases pending before any court or 
uthority immediately before the establishment 
tribunal as would have been within the 
ction of such tribunal if the cases of action 
h suits or proceedings are based had arisen 
uch establishment; 
or amend any order mady by the president 
lause (3) of article 371(D); 
such supplemental incidental and conse-
1 provisions (including provisions as to 
s parliament may deem necessary for tlie 
ve functioning of, and for the speedy 
1 of cases by, and the enforcement of the 
of, such tribunals." 
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clause (2)(e) of article 323A. Therefore, one may 
justify exclusion of the writ jurisdiction of the 
High Courts on the ground that this has been done not 
by an ordinary Act of Parliament but by an Act specially 
empowered to make such provisions by the constitution 
itself. And the provisions of Article 323A are given 
overriding effect by virtue of article 323A(3). . The 
validity of Article 323 A(2)(d) and the Act has been 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar. 12 
11. Article 323A(3) reads: "The provision of the article 
shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any 
other provision of the constitution or in any other 
law for the time being inforce." It is interesting 
to note that part XIV A (Article 323 A and 323B) is 
inserted by the controversial Forty-Second Amendment 
Act 1976, whose ostensible purpose was to restrict 
the judicial review of administrative action. 
In 1985 the Law Commission of India did not agree 
to transfer the jurisdiction of the High Court in 
certain matters to such administrative tribunals. ' 
Then the question was considered by the Administra-
tive Reforms Commission and again by the Swarn Singh 
Committee in 19,76. The Fourty-Second Amendment 
Bill, based on that Committee's report, proposed to 
insert two new articles, 323A and 323 B in the 
Constitution. 
12. S.P. Sampath Kumar V. Union of India (1987) 
1 S.C.C. 12A. 
ACCNo. 
^ ^ '^ UnivexsiW; 
However it is submitted that article 323A(2)(d) not 
only curtails judicial review but also takes away 
writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under article 226, 
which enables thera to mould relief to redress 'injury to 
A--
substantial nature' and 'substantial fpilure of justice'. 
I 
It is needless to mention that certiorari constitutes 
the corner-stone of the structure of judicial control 
over the tribunal if its proceedings result in substan-
tial failure of justice. Thus, it is submitted, becomes 
more imperative in the cases when its decision like the 
tribunals under the Act, is final and free from challenge 
in any court of law. Non accountability of the tribunals 
to the jurisdiction of the High Courts, coupled with 
a very limited redress at the hands of the Supreme Court 
under Article 136, which is in the nature of a special 
or residuary and discretionary power exercisable in 
exceptional cases, might result in denial of justice. 
The Act unconvincingly curtails the power of judicial 
1 3 
review of the High Courts in service matters. A 
perusal of the Act reveals a peculiar institutional 
mechanism or arrangement for judicial review. As 
stated above, on the one hand, it vests in tribunals 
the jurisdiction, power and authority of all courts, 
except the Supreme Court and on the other, it debars all 
courts, except the Supreme Court from exercising any 
jurisdiction , power and authority in service matters. 
Not only does it give finality to the orders of the 
tribunal but also keeps them free from challenge in 
any court including'a High Court. The only exception 
made therein is approach to the Supreme Court under 
articles 32 and 136. Then, it does not mage any reser-
vation with respect to jurisdiction, power and authority 
of the High Court in Service matters. 
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It is important to note at this juncture that 
article 32 can be invoked if there is violation of a 
fundamental right and Article 136 does not entitle a 
person to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of 
right as it is within the court's discr?»tion to grant 
or refuse special leave to appeal. It is, generally, 
not invoked unless there are sufficient extraordinary 
exceptional circumstances which warrant invocation of 
this power. 
It is also worth noting that Articles 226(1) and 
32 confer concurrent or parallel jurisdiction on the 
High Courts and the Supreme Court for protecting the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in part II,I of the 
Constitution, the only difference beingthat the latter 
/ 
itself is a fundamental right, while the former is a 
constitutional one. The object in providing such 
concurrent or parallel jurisdiction to these two judicial 
forums is two fold, viz., to (i) provide quick remedy 
and (ii) offer a choice to the petitioner to select the 
forum to vindicate the fundamental right. The Act 
defeats this constitutional object without any convincing 
reason or rationale. Besides this difference, Article 
226, empowers a High Court to reach injustice wherever 
it is found and to mould the relief to meet the peculiar 
requirement. Lastly the Act unconvincingly makes a 
departure from the existing practice of judicial review 
over other administrative adjudicatory bodies constituted 
by, and functioning under, different statutes. It also 
makes a deep mark on the existing pattern of judicial 
review. Thus the Act it is submitted, breaks and goes 
against the spirit of the constitutionally guaranteed 
equality before law and comprehensive scheme of judicial 
review of administrative action 
This brings us to next query, that whether a High 
Court, which is barred from entertaining a direct writ 
petition and exercising any jurisdiction, power and 
authority in the specified service matters, is also 
barred from entertaining a writ petition against the 
administrative tribunal itself in all circumstance? 
In other words does the Act exclude writ jurisdiction 
14 
of a High Court in toto? The question, to be 
precise, further raises a set of questions. 
14. However, it may be noted that a privative clause, 
whatever may be its phraseology, cannot exclude 
judicial review in toto and there is always some 
residue of jurisdiction left in the High Courts if 
the courts want to do so. The Indian courts, 
however, differ on the quantum of such residuary 
judicialpower. 
M.P. Jain "Judicial Response to privative clause 
in India" 22 J. I.L.I. 1 (1980 
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(i) Is a High Court empowered to issue a writ of 
certiorari if the tribunal refuses to entertain 
an application (under section 19 of the Act dealing 
with the admission of an application of aggrieved 
persons) on the ground that the applicant has no 
case on merit or the matter does not lie under 
its jurisdiction or if the order of the tribunal 
suffers from manifest error of law or jurisdiction? 
(ii) Can it issue a writ of mandamus directing the 
tribunal to entertain an application under section 
19 of the Act and to decide it afresh in accordance 
with the law? 
(iii) Similarly, can a writ of prohibition lie against 
the tribunal if a claim, otherwise unentertainable, 
is entertained due to bias. 
(iv) Can a High Court issue a writ of que warranto 
against a chairman, vice chairman or other member 
of a tribunal when a petitioner, whose application 
is pending before a tribunal claims that the 
15 tribunal is improperly constituted. 
15. K.H. Goyal, Administrative Tribunal Act 1985, 394-95 
(1986) 
8 
It is important to note that the scheme of the 
Act, makes it amply clear that it only precludes the 
High Courts from exercising its jurisdiction, power 
and authority to adjudicate disputes involving consi-
deration of merits of the case in specified service 
matters and confers these powers only on the tribunals 
1 ft 
constituted under it, TheAct debars the High Courts 
from adjudicating a dispute or entertaining a complaint 
as it always involves consideration of the merits of 
the cases thereby leaving its power untouched/unaltered 
in those cases not involving such consideration. Thus it 
makes a distinction between the power and authority of 
the High Court to issue writs in specified service 
matters under sections 14(1), 15(1) and 16 and against 
the administrative tribunals. 
So a writ of certiorari would not lie against 
a decision of the tribunal as it does involve,(1) a 
consideration of merits of the case as to existence/non-
existence of the jurisdiction; of the tribunal; 
(ii) legality or illegality in exercise of its jurisdi-
ction and (iii) a manifest error of law or an error on 
16, P.R. Shenoy andC.M. Stephen, while taking part in 
the debate on the relevant provisions of the fourty-
second Amendment Constitution Bill, had expressed the 
view that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under 
Article 226 should be mentioned specifically and in 
its absence, they apprehended, it would not be possible 
to exclude jurisdiction of the High Courts,(1976) 
LXV L,S,D. (5th Lok Sabha) Col.83,92 (1-11-1976), 
the face of the record in exercise of its jurisdiction, 
power. It is important to note that sections 14(1) and 
15(1) of the Act merely specify broad categories of 
matters falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunals 
and do not specify conditions for determination of any 
jurisdictional fact. The Act, it is submitted, therefore 
envisages that the tribunals have the jurisdiction to 
decide the case rightly or wrongly subject to correction 
by the Supreme Court. The proper remedy in such cases 
is not a petition for writ of certiorari to a High Court 
but to appreach the Supreme Court under Article 136. 
However such writ can be sought if the tribunal decides 
a matter in violation of the principles of natural 
justice or fundamental principles of judicial procedure 
or violation of procedure contemplated under the Act or 
rule as it would not involve consideration of any merits 
of the case before the tribunal. Similarly a High Court 
can be approached for the writ if the tribunal wrongly 
entertains an application under section 19 of the Act 
and decides the case on merits, for example, if a CAT 
entertains an application under this section relating 
to 'recruitment of matters concerning recruitment to 
any civil service of the state or to any civil post 
under the State (which falls in the jurisdiction of a SAT) 
8: 
and decides it or conversely if a SAT entertains an 
application pertaining to a central service on the 
ground that the matter relates to the staff service 
and decides it. As these case only invo.ke questions 
of subject-wise jurisdiction stipulated in the Act, it 
would involve no consideration of, their merits. 
A writ of mandamus would be justifiably asked 
by a person holding a civil post, if the tribunal 
wrongfully refuses to entertain his petition under 
section 19 by taking the view that the post is not a 
civil one, to direct it not to refuse the petition on 
the ground but to consider the question of entertainment 
on merits. Similarly, a writ of prohibition can be sought 
if the tribunal entertains an application in respect of a 
recruitment or service matter which is not a civil post 
or civil service at all. The writ could also be asked 
by the state authorities if the central tribunal enter-
tains an application by a state employee under section 19 
of the Act in respect of a recruitment or service matter, 
which is not in its jurisdiction or vice versa. Even 
if the state authorities or the Central Government or 
authority, as the case may be, failed to take recourse 
to article 226, a rival employee, who may be aggrieved 
by such entertainment of an application in matters 
relating to seniority or promotion or ralidity of 
appointment, can approach the High Court for such writ. 
This view finds support in a ruling of CAT where 
the view was taken that an application of a party for the 
writ of prohibition goes as a matter of right if defects 
of jurisdiction are apparent on the face of the proceed-
ings and are not dependent on determination of any facts 
of the case. Again the writ, it seems, can be sought 
from the High Court against the chairman refusing to 
exercise his powers under section 25 of the Act to transfer 
a case from a bench, a member of which is biased against 
or in favour of a party, to another for its disposal. 
Lastly, a writ of quo warranto, which is generally issued 
against any determination of an issue by an improperly 
constituted tribunal, can be sought by a person whose 
case is pending before a tribunal if its chairman, vice-
chairman or a member is not qualified to be appointed as 
18 
such under section 6 of the Act. 
These are mere speculations of the approach of the 
High Courts in service matters as it has not figured in 
Sampath Kumar's case. 
17. K.J.C. Bose V. Union of India, 1986 1 S.C.T. (CAT) 52. 
18. K.N, Goyal, Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 394-95 
(1986) 
19. S.P. Sampath Kumar V. Union of India ARI 1987 S.C. 386 
20 In J.B. Chopra Suprenie Court gives the view 
that the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1-985 was a law 
made by Parliament under clause (1) of Art 323-A to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the Hi^^ Co_u£_ts__jjn_d£r_ A£t^ icle 
226 and 227 of the Constitution. Madhya Pradesh High 
Court in M.P. High Court Bar Association V. Union of 
21 India carried this logic little further by holding 
that the Administrative Tribunal was a substitute of 
the High Court and hence it was doubtful if the High 
Court is left with its jurisdiction under Article 227 
of the constitution to exercise powers of superintendence, 
over Administrative Tribunals. These cases show that even 
an unintentional observation of the Supreme Court carries 
with it not only the weight of authority but is accepted 
as binding and serves as the basis of developing law in 
a direction not intended even by the Supreme Court. 
22 In Awadhesh Kumar Singh decided by a division 
bench Patna High Court is a fine example of judicial 
craftsmanship and a bold attempt to assert independence 
of judiciary. High Court held that "the High Court can 
not be denied its constitutional authority to issue writs 
and to exercise superintendence by a law made by the 
20. J.B. Chopra V. Union of India A.I.R, 1987 S.C. 357 
21. 1989 J.L.J. 3A2. 
22. Awadhesh Kumar Singh V. State of Bihar 
A.I.R. 1988 Patna 272. 
State legislature. Examining the provisions of the 
Act in detail the High Court held that the Tribunal 
created under the Act was not an effective alternative 
mechanism or arrangement for judicial review to replac_e 
the High Court. The court, therefore, concluded that 
its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the 
Constitution was not affected by the Act in any manner." 
Approach of the Supreme Court, therefore, is yet to be 
known on these aspects. However, it is submitted that 
the High Court, though its jurisdiction, power or 
authority is excluded in the specified service matters, 
may exercise its power to issue prerogative writs for a 
limited purpose in the above mentioned situations. ^Thus 
neither the constitution nor the Act envisage the 
power to issue writs by a tribunal in service matters. 
The Act takes away the High Court's powers to issue 
appropriate order, direction or writ to enforce the 
fundamental rights or to seek redress of any injury of 
substantial nature or of s'ub-staintial failure of justice 
arising out of the matters . perfaining to the specified 
services. But this would prejudice the interests of the 
government employee or local or other authorities contro-
lled or owned by the government, as the Supreme Court is 
the only authority under the Act to issue appropriate 
writs, orders or directions for enforcement of the 
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fundamental rights. There could be injury of substantial 
nature or substantial failure of justice in service 
matters without resulting in violation of any of the 
fundamental rights. For example, (i) passing orders or 
making of rules in violation of article 309(recruitment 
and conditions of service of persons serving the Union 
or a State) '(ii) article 310 (tenure of office of 
persons serving the Union or state) and (iii) in civil 
capacities under the union or a state or illegality in 
any proceedings before the tribunals. 
Such injury of substantial nature on substantial 
failure of justice hitherto the High Court could redress 
by issuing appropriate directions orders of writs under 
clauses (b) and (c) of Article 226. The only remedy 
provided under the Act is approach to the Supreme Court 
undeir Article 136, which empowers the court, in its 
discretion, to grant special leave to appeal from any judge-
ment, degree, determination, sentence or order in any 
cause or matter passed or made by a tribunal,, There 
are two limitations: First, the petitioner cannot approach 
the Supreme Court unless the order is factually detrimental 
to him and the tribunal has adjudicated it. Second, the 
Supreme Court, if it exercises its discretion, will not 
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Such injury of substantial nature on substantial 
failure of justice hitherto the High Court could redress 
by issuing appropriate directions orders of writs under 
clauses (b) and (c)of Article 226. The only remedy 
provided under the Act is approach to the Supreme Court 
under Article 136, which empowers the court, in its 
discretion, to grant special leave to appeal from any judge-
ment, degree, determination, sentence or order in any 
cause or matter passed or made by a tribunal,. There 
are two limitations: First, the petitioner cannot approach 
the Supreme Court unless the order is factually detrimental 
to him and the tribunal has adjudicated it. Second, the 
Supreme Court, if it exercises its discretion, will not 
be able to provide any remedy unless and until it goes 
into the merits of the case and decides the appeal. 
The petitioners in the cases mentioned above are reme-
diless till the appeal is disposed of by the Supreme 
Court. This is not necessary for the High Courts under 
clauses (b) and (c) of Article 226, which empower it 
to issue appropriate orders, directions or writes in 
such cases to provide quick remedy to the petitioner. 
But this is not the end of the matter. The Act 
vests in the tribunals widely defined categories of 
jurisdiction in service matters and ousts the juris-
diction of the Hieh Courts in such matters. 
The Act as stated not only excludes the juris-
diction of all courts, except the Supreme Court, indus-
trial tribunals labour court and other authorities 
under finality to the orders of the tribunals. It 
immunises them from any challenge in a court of law, 
including the High Courts. It also makes no provision 
for appeal against 'order' of the tribunal either 
from one administrative tribunal to another or to the 
courts of law except the SupremeCourt. A party aggri-
eved by the orders of the tribunal can approach only 
that court by invoking its jurisdiction under 
articles 32 and 136. Article 32 is available only in 
9^ : 
cases involving violation of the fundamental rights 
while Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant 
special leave to appeal against any determination of 
order of the tribunal.- The Act, .therefore, in effect, 
envisages judicial control over administrative tribunals 
by the Supreme court only. 
No doubt. Article 136 vests vast discretionary 
powers in the Supreme Court but it has itself set the 
limit by permitting invocation by this power in very 
exceptional circumstances, viz., when a question of 
law of general public importance arises or shocks the 
conscience of the court and the special leave is not 
granted as a matter of course but only for good and 
sufficient reasons and miscarriage of justice. Recently 
23 the Supreme Court in S.G. Chemicals has reiterated as -
The powers of this court under article 136 are 
very wide but as clause (1) of that article itself 
states the grant of special leave to appeal is in the 
discretion of the court. Article 136 is, therefore 
not designed to permit direct access to this court 
23. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Employees Union V. Management 
1986(2) S.C.C. 624. 
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where other equally efficacious remedy is available 
and where the question is not of public importance. 
Today, when the dockets of this court are overcrowded, 
may almost chocked, with the flood, or rather the 
avalanche, of work pouring into the court, threatening 
to sweep away the present system of administration 
of justice itself, the court should be extremely vigi-
lant in exercising its discretion under article 136. 
It shows that the Act not only vests in the 
tribunals the sweeping powers in the specified service 
matters and matters connected therewith but also 
precludes all courts, except the Supreme Court, from 
exercising their jurisdiction, power and authority in 
such service matters. It also gives finality and 
immunity to the orders of the tribunals from challenge 
in any court including the High Court. It virtually 
transfers all the jurisdiction, powers and authority 
of the High Courts including writ, jurisdiction and 
power of judicial review to the•tribunals. Thus it 
would emerge as all in all so far as service matters 
are concerned. 
POWERS OF TRIBUNAL TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT -
If people lose faith in courts the administration 
of justice will become impossible. So scandalisation of 
a judge or jury as a whole is a criminal contempt. 
Making offending remarks against a judge in Iiis 
capacity as a judge is a contempt. But criticising 
him in his private capacity e.g. he is bad driver, 
is not a contempt, nor is this contempt to criticise 
his religious and political views which a judge may 
utter in a public speech. 
The law treats a contempt as harsher than 
mere defamation, because in defamation only one's 
reputation is affected, the contempt of courts invo-
lves distraction or interference in the course of 
justice or proper administration of law; it is a 
wrong to the public because it undetermines the 
authority of law. The constitution has given powers 
to the Supreme Court and High Courts to punish 
contempt of Courts below them. 
The persons making applications to a Tribunal 
or their lawyers as well as presenting officers 
should cultivate the art of pressing firmly and 
politely their views without losing their balance 
in exhibiting contumacious behaviour. With that 
object in view, a Tribunal has been empowered to 
exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority 
in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has 
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Section 17 of the Act, which contemplates 
the power to punish for contempt, lays down that 
a Tribunal shall have, and exercise the same 
jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of 
contempt of itself as a High Court has and may 
eKercise 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Administrative justice has grown and developed 
over the last three decades. This growth is due to a 
great extent, to the large number of adjudicating 
agencies that have been established under various 
statutes or or^ders, v/hich are generically described as 
'Tribunals'. The proliferation of these adjudicating 
agencies, in turn, is a by - product of the massive 
national effort to carry through welfare and development 
programmes and the consequent growth of the administra-
tive state . 
'Justice is blind' is an old proverb. Although 
it may be true of judicial justice, it should not apply 
to administrative justice. On the contrary, it should 
be justice dispensed with eyes and ears wide open. A 
tribunal should take into cognisance even those facts 
which the parties may not be able to present in the 
manner strictly required under law. Frequently, it so 
happens that a petitioner in a case suffers injustice 
because of procedural or formal requirements which he 
cannot fulfil. In such situations, when he deserves 
relief but is not able to obtain it through normal 
channels, he should be able to obtain it through a 
Tribunal. 
The background and qualifications of the 
personnel determine the degree of efficiency of the 
Tribunal, both in terms of promoting public policy 
and in protecting the lawful rights and interests of 
the citizens concerned. Accordingly, it is suggested 
that the Tribunals should ordinarily consist of more 
than one member, with such qualifications as may blend 
judicial with administrative experience and yet make 
room for the requisite degree of expertise peculiear 
to each case. Since our socio-political system is 
pluralistic in character and composition and, being 
based on caste and class, is highly stratified, the 
membership of the Tribunals, other things including 
qualification and experience being equal, should comprise 
selectively persons of different socio-ethnic groups, 
in order to make administrative justice efficient, 
assimilative and participative. 
The worth of a*Tribunal is judged by its in-
expensive expeditiousness, in addition to expertise, 
flexibility and freedom from technical complexities. A 
study of the procedures and methods of operation adopted 
by the Tribunals, however, reveals that they do not 
satisfy these criteria. A Tribunal takes about three 
1. Michael Walzer, 'Spheres of Justice' - A Defence of 
Pluralism and Equality (Oxford. 1986). 
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to four years to dispose of an application. In some 
cases it has taken nine to ten years. The reasons for 
delay are many and inherent in the adjudicating process. 
Scheduled hearings of a case are frequently postponed 
because the officer concerned has had to leave head 
quarters on functions other than tribunal. Either 
there has been a law and order problem which he must 
tackle on priority or a natural calamity in which he 
must supervise relief operations. It is not easy for 
him to combine routine administrative functions with 
the dispensation of justice in matters under his juris-
diction. If expeditiousness is to be promoted, the 
government should accord primacy to the role of an 
official at a Tribunal over the other roles he is to 
play. 
The creation of Tribunals, especially conferment 
of judicial powers on executive authorities, shows a 
trend contrary to the spirit of the directive principles 
concerning separation of the judiciary from the executive 
as enshrined in Article 50 of the constitution of India. 
Although the concept of separation of powers has led to 
more of safety than of efficiency, in the present admini-
strative state there is greater commingling of powers, 
which may lead to abuse of power. This calls for 
additional safeguards. 
Furthermore, tribunals are expected to be 
independent. When an officer exercises statutory 
judicial power, he is, technically speaking, subject 
only to the superintendence of the High Court; he is 
not subordinate to his administrative superior. A 
minister is not responsible for the judicial decisions 
of the officers under him, nor for the acts of the 
tribunal related to his department. Both the Supreme 
Court and the High Courts have said in several of 
their decisions that an officer acting as a Tribunal 
should apply his own mind and not receive directions 
and instructions from administrative superiors. The 
permissibility on the part of the adjudicating agencies 
and the abuse of official position by superior authori-
ties is expanding the field of non-legislative guidelines 
in a given system of administrative justice, should be 
watched and curtailed. Power conferred by law on one 
person should not be surrendered by him in favour of 
another. 
Administrative justice in India needs controls, 
both internal and external. Internally, appeals on 
questions of fact may be made to higher administrative 
tribunals and the doctrine of exhaustion should be 
implemented in letter and spirit. Externally, in the 
last resort, such appeals may be filed to the Supreme 
Court as the highest court of the land. Even the 
Scandinavian prototype of 'ombudsmen' or 'lokpal' or 
'lokayukts' already established in other sectors could 
be empowered to provide external control over adjudica-
ting tribunals. Of course, these may only influence 
the functioning of Tribunals peripherally. Nevertheless, 
they may act as an instrument of judicial audit and may 
prevent the abuse of power or authority to a greater 
extent. It would also lessen the probability of biased, 
unjust or wrong decisions by Tribunals. 
A Tribunal should follow such procedure as best 
facilitates the achievement of its objective. It should 
adopt a procedure that is not only open and objective, 
but also flexible. It should strive for a liberal 
interpretation of the principles of Natural Justice and 
apply those principles in a manner that ensures efficiency 
and impartiality and reduces delay and e 1 i ni j, n a L o s b iji^ -r 
It is no doubt true that administrative justice 
through Administrative Tri-bunals is a welcome step. 
There are certain definite advantages of tribunals. 
Court justice tends to be highly technical whereas 
tribunals function free from many technicalities of 
law. Tribunals employ experts in contrast to courts who 
0 1 
lifivp 'nil r on ndr r .'I ' . But thin doPH not inrwiii lli/il I lie 
system of tribunals which is designed may even run 
contrary to the basic structure of the constitution. 
It would be a good idea to evolve Tribunals in diff-
erent fields under the overall supervision and review 
of High Courts and the Supreme Court. Judicial umbrella 
is essential over the Tribunals. JPtiis umbrella will 
not check the growth of Tribunals. In fact, it will 
help in the 'Quality of Justice'. Our experience with 
the tribunals which have been functioning so far under 
the High Courts and the Supreme Court has been good. 
Substantial number of cases stand adjudicated at the 
tribunal level only. Some cases to to the High Courts 
and a smaller number of cases stand adjudicated at the 
Supreme Court. This is understandable. There is no 
justification to bid farewell to this process. The 
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is a step backward 
in the Administration of justice inasmuch as it excludes 
the normal judicial review over the Tribunals. Have 
Administrative Tribunals, but provide judicialreview 
over them. Sooner it is realised, the better it will 
be. Further the exclusion of the defence person from 
the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal is under-
standable but the exclusion of Supreme Court, High Court, 
l O E 
Parliament and State legislatures from' the jurisdiction 
of Administrative Tribunal appears to be wholely 
indefensiable. The Act does not give any reason for 
their exclusion. Therefore the scope of Administrative 
Tribunal should also extent to them. 
By enacting the Administrative Tribunal Act the 
Parliament has undoubtedly ful-filled a long desire 
by creating Administrative Tribunal in order to provide 
efficient speedy and cheap Admini.g-tfative Justice to the 
civil servants. 
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